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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 OVERVIEW AND SCOPE 
Hinton and Higgs (Ireland) Limited were requested by the Commission of the European 
Communities to conduct a study on emergencies after accidents in Ireland either in 
process/storage plants or during the transportation of dangerous substances - dangerous 
substances as defined in the EC Directive 82/501/EEC (1) (commonly referred to as the 
"Seveso Directive"), as amended by Directive 87/216/EEC (2), and as amended by Directive 
881610/EEC (3). 
The main objectives of the study are as follows: 
- to collate information on the policy and statutory basis of emergency planning and 
response in Ireland, 
- to collate information on relevant accidents which have occurred in Ireland, 
- to analyse and evaluate the collated material to determine relevant lessons which may be 
used to improve emergency planning and response within the EC. 
The broad aim of this study is to gather information on emergency planning and response and 
to enhance communication and understanding on this issue within the European Community. 
The scope of this study encompasses emergency planning and response provisions for 
accidents involving dangerous substances either in fixed installations subject to the 
requirements of the "Seveso Directive" or during transportation. Accidents involving 
radioactive substances, the manufacture and storage of explosives, extraction and mining 
operations, licensed toxic and dangerous waste sites and military installations are outside the 
scope of this study and therefore are not considered. 
The study has two main parts. The first part is a comprehensive review of the policy and 
statutory framework for emergency planning and response in Ireland. The government policy, 
statutory requirements and organisations relevant to this issue are detailed. These include the 
central and local government authorities, emergency services, voluntary services, industry 
and any other relevant organisations. The complete range of organisations have been included 
and consulted to provide as wide a scope of information as possible. 
The second part of the study focuses on relevant accidents which have occurred in Ireland at 
both fixed installations and during transportation. Four fixed installations and thirteen 
transport accidents were deemed suitable for analysis. The accidents are described only in 
sufficient detail to illustrate the emergency planning and response aspects. The following 
areas were analysed for each accident: 
- Pre-emergency planning, 
- Relevant accident descriptions including the emergency services involved 
and the actions they performed, 
- Information dissemination to the public and media, 
- Post accident actions, 
- Evaluation of the suitability and efficiency of the emergency planning and response 
during and after the accident. 
All the relevant organisations were consulted during the analysis of these accidents. These 
include relevant Companies, emergency services, government agencies, industrial 
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representatives and the Central and Local Competent Authorities responsible for the 
legislation implementing the "Seveso Directive" in Ireland. Therefore, a wide range of 
opinions in terms of the resulting lessons learnt on emergency planning and response were 
obtained. In addition, the Central and Local Competent Authorities, emergency services, 
government and industrial bodies were consulted for their evaluation of the emergency 
planning provisions in Ireland. 
The list of the sources who kindly provided information for this study are detailed in 
Appendix 3. I would like to take this opportunity to thank all of these people for their time 
and co-operation. 
1.2 EXECUTION OF STUDY 
There is no single organisation responsible for emergency planning in Ireland. This 
responsibility is divided between several organisations. Therefore, all relevant government 
and non-government bodies involved in emergency planning and response were contacted to 
inform them of the study and request their co- operation where relevant. 
All of the organisations contacted have been very co-operative and provided invaluable 
information. Meetings have been conducted as required with each relevant body. The 
organisations have provided a broad range of expert opinions for this study. They have 
provided information on the: 
-policy, legislative and organisational structure for emergency planning and response, 
-accidents analysed, 
- lessons learnt on emergency planning and response. 
The Central Competent Authority responsible for enforcing the Regulations implementing 
Directive 82/501/EEC in Ireland - the Health and Safety Authority (HSA) provided their 
expert advice on, inter alia, a suitable choice of accidents for analysis. 
The information requested from relevant sources was presented in the form of an 
outline/questionnaire which was customised to suit the responsibilities of each organisation 
contacted. A generic outline of the information requested is in Appendix 4. 
A Data Collection Form was developed to present information on the accidents analysed in 
an ease-related" format. The form was distributed to relevant organisations and their 
comments were incorporated. 
Finally, the relevant organisations from government, emergency services, industry, etc ... have 
commented on this report to ensure it is an accurate representation of the emergency planning 
situation in Ireland. 
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2. POLICY, LEGISLATION, AND ORGANISATION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The detailed description of the Irish policy, legislative and organisational framework for 
emergency planning and response is set out as follows: 
- Organisation structure 
- Policy framework 
- Statutory requirements 
- Roles played by organisations in emergency planning and response: 
-Pre incident/accident 
- During incident/accident 
-Post incident/accident 
- Communication structure: 
- Liaison between organisations 
- Telecommunications 
- Public and media. 
2.2 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING 
AND RESPONSE 
2.2.1 Introduction 
This section is a brief introduction to the key players in emergency planning and response in 
Ireland. The specific roles and functions of these organisations will be detailed in Section 2.5 
- Roles played by organisations involved in emergency planning and response. 
2.2.2 Central Government 
There is no single organisation responsible for major emergencies involving dangerous 
substances in Ireland. The responsibility is distributed ,throughout several organisations with 
the main activity at a local level. At central government level emergency planning 
responsibility is spread between the Department of Labour (now known as the Department of 
Enterprise and Employment,) the Department of the Environment, the Department of 
Justice and the Department of Health. Each Department provides guidance and advice on 
emergency planning to the agencies responsible at local level. Each Department provides 
guidance for a specific local agency as follows: 
- The Department of the Environment advise the Local Authorities, 
- The Department of Health advise the Health Boards, 
- The Department of Justice advise the Irish police - the Garda Siochana. 
The Department of Transport, Energy and Communications and the Department of Marine 
are the central government bodies involved in the transport of dangerous substances by road, 
rail, air and sea respectively. 
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2.2.3 Central Competent Authority for Directive 82/501/EEC 
Directive 82/501/EEC is implemented in Irish legislation by Statutory Instrument (S.I.) No. 
292 of 1986 European Communities (Major Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial 
Activities) Regulations, 1986 (4) as amended by S.I. 194 of 1989 (5) as amended by S.I. 21 
of 1992 (6). The Minister for Labour is designated as the Central Competent Authority 
which is the main enforcement body under the Regulations. Enforcement and inspection 
under the Regulations is performed by the National Authority for Occupational Safety and 
Health, which is known as the Health and Safety Authority (HSA) (hereafter referred to as 
the HSA). The Health and Safety Authority are a state sponsored body under the aegis of the 
Department of Enterprise and Employment. 
2.2.4 Local Competent Authorities 
The Local Competent Authorities responsible for local implementation of the off-site 
planning provisions of the "Seveso Regulations" are as follows: 
- the Local Authorities, 
- the Health Board, 
- the Garda Siochana. 
For emergency planning purposes, there are thirty-three Local Authorities in Ireland 
organised as County Councils and Corporations. The Local Authorities come under the 
guidance of the Department of the Environment. The Local Authority emergency services 
include the Fire Services, Environmental Services, Housing and Sanitary Services. 
The Health Boards come under the jurisdiction of the Department of Health. They are 
responsible for the provision of hospital and ambulance services. Ireland is divided into eight 
regional health boards for the purposes of administration of the health services. The regional 
health boards are as follows: 
- Eastern Health Board 
- Midland Health Board 
- Mid-Western Health Board 
- North-Eastern Health Board 
North-Western Health Board 
South-Eastern Health Board 
Southern Health Board 
Western Health Board. 
The Garda Siochana are a national police service under the guidance of the Department of 
Justice. There are five Garda Siochana divisions in the Dublin Metropolitan area and eighteen 
divisions throughout the rest of Ireland. 
The main designated emergency services are the Local Authorities, Health Boards and the 
Garda Siochana. 
2.2.5 Other organisations involved in Emergency Planning and Response 
An accident involving dangerous substances may require the response and co- ordination of a 
variety of public, private and voluntary organisations. In addition to those mentioned already 
these may include Civil Defence, Defence Forces, industrial advisors, specialist experts, 
utilities (e.g Telecomm Eireann {Irish telephone service}, Electricity Supply Board, Bus 
Eireann (Irish Bus), Iarnod Eireann {Irish Rail}) and other relevant bodies. The co-ordination 
of these organisations in emergency planning and response is described in Section 2.5. 
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2.3 POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING IN IRELAND 
2.3.1 Major Emergency Planning 
Historically, the Health Boards have played a leading role in Major Emergency Planning in 
Ireland. This is particularly true of the Southern Health Board which is responsible for 
emergency planning specifically in the Southern Health Board region of Counties Cork and 
Kerry. The Southern Health Board developed an "all risks" emergency plan (called the Major 
Accident Plan (7)) which the Local Authority, Garda Siochana and any other relevant 
emergency services fed into and supported. This plan was tested during several large scale 
accidents in the Southern Health Board region e.g. the Whiddy Island oil tanker explosion 
(January 1979) and the Air India aircraft crash off the south west coast (June 1985). During 
these accidents the activated Plan was found to be effective. As a cumulative result of the 
industrialised Southern Health Board region and the occurrence of several major accidents in 
this area, the Southern Health Board Major Accident Plan developed further and those 
involved in its evolution became specialists in the major emergency planning field. 
In 1982 the Inter-Departmental Committee on Emergency Preparation was convened to 
consider the entire issue of major emergency planning in Ireland. This Committee included 
representatives from the Departments of the Environment, Justice, Health and Defence under 
the chairmanship of a representative from the Department of the Taoiseach (the department of 
the Irish Prime Minister). 
In 1984 the Committee produced, with government approval, the Framework for Co-
ordinated Response to Major Emergency (8) which applies to the Local Authority, Health 
Board and Garda Siochana. The document is designed with a twofold purpose: 
a) to facilitate the preparation of plans by the emergency services and 
b) to ensure a prompt, effective and co-ordinated response by them to a major emergency. 
Under the Framework document each emergency service must prepare a Major Emergency 
Plan (MEP) following the basic structure outlined. These plans must be prepared and 
maintained such that they co-ordinate with each other. 
The framework document defines a "Major Emergency" as: 
"any event which, usually with little or no warning, causes or threatens: 
- death or injury 
- serious disruption of essential services, or 
- damage to property. 
beyond the normal capabilities of the Garda Siochana, Local Authorities (including fire 
authorities) and health services". 
The scope of the MEP is for "Major Emergencies arising, for example, from fires, explosions, 
gas releases, transportation accidents, spillages of dangerous substances etc". Emergencies 
resulting from oil supply crises, electricity blackouts, industrial disputes etc. are of a different 
nature and are not catered for in this plan. However, the plan recognises that such 
emergencies may result in a situation e.g. a gas explosion, which may require activation of 
the MEP. 
The Framework document specifies that each Emergency Plan consists of uniform procedures 
which can standardised nationally. These procedures are classed under the following 
headings: 
- Area of Operation of Plan 
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- Activation of Plan 
- Response of various services 
-Control of Operations (at the site of the emergency) 
- Co-ordination (Remote from the site) 
- Demobilisation 
-Communications 
- Press and information 
- Identification of emergency services personnel/vehicles. 
In addition to the uniform procedures, each Emergency Plan must have documented Pre-
Determined Arrangements (PDAs) giving precise details on the response of the particular 
emergency service to specific incidents and hazards. This section is an adjunct to the 
emergency plan and must be consistent with it. The PDAs are generally organised as 
appendices to the MEP. 
The Framework document also provides guidance on pre-planning procedures. The following 
areas are included: 
-Assessment of resources, capacity, materials and equipment in stock, 
- Specialist advisors 
- Assistance from other bodies, Government Departments 
- Care of supervisors - Accommodation and food 
- Danger area 
-Co-ordination (Remote from site) 
-Post planning and review. 
Specific, precise information relating to each of these areas must be included in the 
appendices of each MEP. In particular, the Framework states that as part of the pre-planning 
process, all permanent or temporary risks within or near the area of operation of the plan 
should be identified and listed. A full appraisal of the resources needed to deal with these 
risks should be included in an appendix to the plan. 
A recommended layout of the site of a major emergency is included in the MEP. Obviously, 
this is only a guideline and should be customised to suit the accident site. An example of the 
layout as recommended in the Framework document is illustrated in Appendix 8. Three 
designated areas are specified in the layout. 
- Holding Area 
- Control Area 
- Danger Area. 
On arrival at the site of an emergency each emergency service will report to and be deployed 
from their specific Holding Area. This area should be inside the perimeter of the incident and 
well upwind of the incident. The Control Area is where each designated emergency services 
Controller of Operations controls, directs and co- ordinates the activities of the respective 
services. Each emergency service at the scene of an emergency will have their own Holding 
and Control Areas. A Danger Area is designated where there is a definite risk to rescue 
personnel because, for example, protective equipment may be required. The senior fire 
brigade officer following consultation with the other Controllers of Operations decides 
whether a Danger Area is required and assumes overall control within this area. 
The overall emergency response is the MEP which, in turn, is the combined plans of the 
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respective Local Authority, Health Board and Garda Siochana in the location of the 
emergency. Plans are prepared by the emergency services responsible for a specified region -
called the functional area. The plans specify the accepted roles and responsibilities of each 
service which have been defined and co-ordinated in advance to ensure a comprehensive 
response. For this purpose the framework document introduced the concept of a Co-
ordinating Group which was to consist of the City/County manager of the Local Authority, 
Chief Executive Officer of the Health Board, and the Chief Superintendent of the Garda 
Siochana, or nominees recommended by them. The Group are responsible for, inter alia, 
meeting once a year to review the arrangements for the co-ordination of the emergency plan 
and review problems which have occurred during the year. 
The Framework stresses co-ordination in preparation and review of the Emergency Plan. 
Emergency services must know the responsibilities, capabilities and emergency procedures of 
the other emergency services in their functional area and, where relevant, adjoining functional 
areas. The procedures in each plan must be "fully compatible". 
When the Framework was introduced, each Local Authority, Health Board and Garda 
Siochana division were requested to update and review their emergency plans in relation to 
the Framework documents. Once guidance is given by any of the relevant Departments or the 
Inter-Departmental Committee, the Local Authorities, Health Boards and Garda Siochana are 
responsible for implementation and updates to the emergency planning procedures as 
required. 
As part of the Framework package, the Department of the Environment issued, to the Local 
Authorities, the "Local Authority Major Emergency Plan, Model" (9) as a model 
specifically for the development of the Local Authority Emergency Plan. Its purpose was: 
a. "to outline generally the procedures to be followed and the functions to be undertaken 
by the Local Authority services, and 
b. to co-ordinate the procedures to be followed and functions to be undertaken by the 
Local Authority, with those of the Health Board, Garda Siochana and any other 
agencies responsible for emergency planning." 
In addition, the Department of the Environment issued to the Local Authorities the 
Explanatory Memorandum Oil the Model Local Authority Major Emerge11cy Plall (10) and 
the Emerge11cy Plallllillg, Ge11eral Advice and Guidelines (11). 
As the Health Boards already had developed an emergency plan, their operations in this area 
were not largely effected by the Framework except to ensure co- ordination of their plan with 
the other emergency service plans. 
In summary, the current situation is that three emergency plans for the three emergency 
services exist for each functional area in the country and these should be co-ordinated by the 
designated Co-ordinating Group in each functional area to comprise the MEP for that area. 
In Ireland there are 64 Major Emergency Plans as follows: 
1 for each of the 33 Local Authorities, 
1 for each of the 8 Health Boards, 
1 for each of the 18 Garda divisions and, 
1 for each of the five Garda divisions in Dublin. 
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In the event of a major emergency, it is intended that at least one of these plans for the 
respective functional area should be activated e.g. 1 Local Authority plan, 1 Health Board 
plan and 1 Garda Siochana plan. The Major Emergency Plan for each Local Authority, 
Garda Division and Health Board for each area respectively are distributed to the respective 
Local Authorities, Garda division and Health Boards in the corresponding area in addition to 
other relevant Local Authorities and agencies. This distribution list is included in the MEP. 
The Framework is an "all hazards" approach to emergency planning and response. It 
appreciates the need for flexibility in the emergency services approach and that their response 
may be influenced by unforeseen factors. The model plan states that even though specific 
procedures have been defined in the plan, initiative and common sense must be used as 
dictated by the emergency situation. 
In 1986 a new Inter-Departmental Committee on Peacetime Emergency Planning was 
established with representatives from the Departments of the Environment, Health, Justice 
and Defence. This committee was established to consider peacetime emergency planning 
arrangements including: 
- the Framework package, 
- exercises conducted to test the MEPs, 
- feedback from actual accidents, and 
- information from international contacts. 
The Committee produced a Report on Peacetime Emergency Planning (12) in March 1989. 
The report concluded that "in general" the Framework documentation was "adequate to 
prepare local emergency response plans". However several issues were considered to require 
further consideration at local, and in some cases central, level". In general, it was 
recommended that a greater co-ordination between the emergency planning requirements of 
the individual emergency services should be considered within their normal capital and 
operational programmes. 
Specifically the report makes recommendations on the following aspects of emergency 
planning and response: 
- Activation of the plan, 
-Hazard analysis, 
- Special equipment, 
- Communications with the public and media, 
- Exceptional measures, 
- Request for any assistance, 
- Co-ordination of response, 
- Arrangements with the meteorological office, 
- Emergency exercises, 
- Stockpiling fuel supplies, 
- Identification of personnel, 
- Information update on emergency planning, 
- Information update on emergency planning initiatives at EC level. 
This report was distributed to all the major emergency services for their information and, 
where necessary, to update their emergency plans in accordance with the report. 
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The Committee functions as an advisory body which provides guidance to the Local 
Authorities, Health Boards and Garda Siochana on emergency planning. They also make the 
decisions concerning any changes to emergency planning procedures. Once guidance, advice 
or decisions are made by the Committee, the relevant Departments advise the local agencies 
for which they are respectively responsible. 
2.3.2 Emergency Exercises 
General Advice and Guidelines on Major Emerge/ley Plalls: Plallllillg alld Stagillg all 
Exercise (13) were produced in June 1989 by the Department of the Environment. 
This document highlights the essential role of emergency exercises in the emergency planning 
process. 
The introduction states that the ability of the emergency services to respond effectively to a 
major emergency largely depends on: 
- "understanding the major emergency plan, 
- operating of the plan itself, 
- ability to work effectively and in co-ordination with all other, agencies responding, 
- general level of training within each service, 
-pre-determined arrangements ( PDAs) for different services response." 
It stresses how the organisation and staging of emergency exercises provides the ideal 
opportunity to assess the effectiveness of the MEP in practice. As a result of exercises, 
deficiencies or potential improvements may be identified and remedied before a major 
emergency occurs and it is too late. In addition, emergency exercises provide a training 
opportunity to personnel in which they become familiar with their roles and responsibilities 
as detailed in the MEP. 
The emergency exercise is to be as realistic as possible a simulation of some or all parts of a 
real emergency. The response taken and action performed must be as for a real emergency. 
The exercise scenario is generally devised to be the worst possible case. 
There are 3 types of exercise: 
-Desk Exercise, 
- Limited Scale Exercise, 
- Full Scale Exercise. 
These vary respectively from table top simulations to full scale "on the ground" simulations 
including the mobilisation and co-ordination of resources and personnel from several 
different organisations. Simple exercises should be performed initially and on a regular basis. 
Desk exercises are to be conducted on an annual basis. On culmination of simple exercises a 
full scale exercise may be worked up to. 
Sufficient planning must be conducted before the exercise. Specific provisions for this 
include: 
- Scenario and narrative 
- Location/site 
-Observers/umpires 
-Safety 
-Timescale 
- Refreshments. 
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Pre-planning of the exercises is highlighted as an important aspect. Pre-exercise seminars 
maybe conducted if required, to fully familiarise all participating personnel with the 
procedures of the MEP, their role and the objectives of the exercise. 
Additional considerations as follows are considered in the guidelines: 
-secrecy, 
- level of response to exercises, 
- identification of personnel, 
-dealing with the media, 
- maintenance of a log, 
- liaison and co-operation between controllers, 
- liaison and co-operation of the co-ordinating groups. 
A number of sample narratives are included in the guidelines for simple and more detailed 
scenarios. Sample expected responses are also included which may be used in monitoring the 
exercise. It is recommended that expected responses are drafted for each exercise. 
One of the sample scenarios of particular interest to this study is for a chemical leak. This 
scenario was developed by the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMAH) and 
has been suitably adapted by the Department of the Environment. This scenario may be 
tailored for use as a simple through to full scale exercise. A copy of this is included at 
Appendix 5. 
On issue of the General Advice and Guidelines document the Local Authorities were 
encouraged to establish a major emergency exercise programme if such a programme had not 
already been initiated. 
Feedback from Major Emergency Planning exercises held in Ireland and abroad were 
produced in the Memorandum on Emergency Planning and Emergency Exercises (14) 
issued in September 1992. This memorandum considered matters requiring particular 
attention in emergency plan preparation and emergency exercises. All Local Authorities were 
requested to review their MEPs and exercise provisions based on this memorandum. 
As an example of an emergency exercise, a recent full-scale exercise was conducted at 
Aughinish Island in County Limerick. The scenario involved an aircraft which develops 
engine trouble off the Irish coast. On its approach to Shannon airport, an engine falls off and 
hits part of an industrial installation resulting in a major release of caustic and the rupture and 
fire of a heavy fuel oil storage tank. Additional fires are caused by falling debris in a part of 
the installation under construction and used by contractors. The realism of a scenario is often 
a limitation in exercises. An example of some of the practical provisions used to make the 
scenario as realistic as possible include: the provision of suitable props; fifty "casualties"; a 
passenger manifest which co-ordinated with the casualties hospital charts detailing a variety 
of injuries from broken bones to thermal burning; telephone calls were organised to bombard 
the emergency services, government departments, hospitals, airport etc ... as would be the case 
in a real emergency; and the transport by civilian volunteers of the initial less seriously 
injured casualties to hospital in private cars as this is sometimes how hospitals first become 
aware of a major emergency. 
2.4 STATUTORY BASIS FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING AND 
RESPONSE IN IRELAND 
The Major Emergency Planning Framework in Ireland is a policy framework and 1s not 
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implemented by legislation. The policy has evolved on the basis of experience to suit 
emergencies relevant to Ireland and reflects the administrative system and mechanism for 
handling accidents. To date, the main activity on Major Emergency Planning, with the 
exception of the legislation implementing Directive 82/501/EEC and its amendments, has 
been undertaken by the major response agencies in accordance with government departments. 
2.4.1 Irish Legislation Implementing Directive 82/501/EEC 
As stated in section 2.2.3 the legislation implementing Directive 82/501/EEC in Ireland is S.I. 
No. 292 of 1986 European Communities (Major Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial 
Activities) Regulations, 1986, as amended by S.I. 194 of 1989 and as amended by S.I. 21 of 
1992 (hereafter referred to as the "Seveso Regulations"). 
In addition to the legislation, the previous Department of Labour (now the Department of 
Enterprise and Employment) issued a Guide to European Communities (Major Accident 
Hazards of Certain bzdustrial Activities) Regulations, 1986 (15). In addition, the 
Department of the Environment has issued The Seveso Directive - Emergency Planning 
Guidance Notes for Local Authorities on the European Communities (Major Accident 
Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities) Regulations, 1986 (16). 
The "Seveso Regulations" apply to industrial activities where there is or may be involved 
dangerous substances as defined in Annex IT, III or IV of Directive 82/501/EEC. 
The Regulations have application at two levels - general and specific requirements. The 
general requirements apply to all industrial activities covered by the Regulations. The specific 
requirements apply only where the quantities of dangerous substances exceed specified 
thresholds. 
In Ireland there are 250 installations subject to the general requirements of the Regulations 
and approximately 21 installations subject to the specific requirements (on-site, off-site plans 
and information for the safety of the public). 
2.4.1.1 General Requirements 
The manufacturer has the general duty to prevent major accidents occurring in the 
establishment and to limit the consequences of such accidents to man and the environment. 
To do this Regulation 10 specifies these duties as follows: 
i Identification of all major accident hazards: 
- identification of each dangerous substance on site, 
- the maximum quantities involved, 
- their location and use, 
- the possible release pathways which could result in a major accident. 
ii Adoption of appropriate safety measures. 
iii Provision of information, training and equipment to ensure the safety of persons 
working at the site. 
This information should include: 
- Steps taken to ensure people on site are informed of the major accident hazards; 
Steps to ensure staff have been appropriately trained and that any special protective 
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equipment such as fire fighting equipment or breathing apparatus (BA) etc. has been 
provided. The range of information and training provided for staff at different levels 
of responsibility should be indicated. 
iv Use the Best Practicable Means (BPM) to prevent major emissions of dangerous 
substances and to render them harmless. 
v Notify the HSA as soon as a major accident occurs and supply necessary details to 
them. 
2.4.1.2 Specific Requirements 
For industrial activities and isolated storage where dangerous substances are involved at a 
specified amount, more specific requirements apply. These include: 
a) Notification of the industrial activity to the HSA, 
b) On-site emergency plan, 
c) Off-site emergency plan, 
d) Information for the safety of the public. 
a) Notification of industrial activities 
Pursuant to Regulation 12, manufacturers must notify the HSA of their industrial activities 
using a written notification. According to the Department of Labour guide to the Regulations, 
the information in the notification is divided into two broad areas: 
i) factual information about the establishment, its activities and location, and 
ii) reasoned arguments and conclusions as to the nature, likelihood and scale of potential 
major accidents at the site and the provisions set up to prevent them and limit their 
consequences. 
The notification contents includes information under the following headings: 
- name, address of establishment and registered business, 
- identity of the substance and brief indication of the hazards, 
- brief description of the hazards created by the substances to man and to the environment, 
-stage of the activity in which the substances are/maybe involved, 
- chemical and physical behaviour of substances under normal, relevant working 
conditions, 
- other substances which could effect the potential hazards, 
- information relating to the establishment, 
- information on the management of the industrial activity, 
- information relating to possible major accidents. 
The specific requirements for the notification are detailed in Appendix 6 (a). 
The guide suggests that the sources of the information will include the following: 
- data of a process engineering nature, including hardware specification, 
- data of an organisational nature (procedure, operating instructions, maintenance 
procedures etc.), 
- the hazard identification and evaluation techniques used by the manufacturer. 
Regulation 13 specifies a report to be produced relating to the notification. Notifications must 
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be updated every three years and also before modifications which may have an impact on the 
major accident hazards. 
If the notification on reports submitted are inadequate, the HSA may request the details to be 
investigated. 
b) On-site emergency plan 
Under regulation 15 it is the duty of the manufacturer to prepare an on-site emergency plan. 
This plan should include: 
- details of how major accidents will be dealt with on-site, 
- names of persons authorised to take action, 
-names of persons responsible for safety, 
- names of those to provide expert advice to the Local Competent Authorities in an 
accident. 
When preparing this plan the manufacturer must consult with all appropriate persons 
including the Local Competent Authorities. This plan must be reviewed and updated as 
necessary. 
c) Off-site emergency plan 
Regulation 16 specifies that it is the function of the Local Competent Authorities upon 
notification from the HSA of a relevant industrial activity, in their functional area to prepare 
an off-site emergency plan. This is an emergency plan for dealing with the effects of a major 
accident outside the installation. The HSA notifies the relevant Local Competent Authorities 
using a format similar to the initial site notification detailed in Appendix 6(a). 
The Local Competent Authorities have nine months to prepare the off-site plan. They must 
consult with the manufacturer to obtain the required information for preparation of the plan. 
They also consult with the HSA to ensure that duplication of information requested from the 
manufacturers is avoided. The Local Competent Authorities have the right to information 
from the manufacturer relevant to the nature, extent and likely effects off-site of a major 
accident. The manufacturer has one month to provide any requested information. If it is not 
provided or is inadequate the Local Competent Authority may request the information from 
the HSA who, in turn, have the power to obtain relevant information which is not already 
available from the manufacturer. 
In preparation of the off-site plan each Local Competent Authority must consult with the 
following agencies: 
-the other Local Competent Authorities in the functional area and adjacent functional 
areas if relevant, 
- the manufacturer, 
-the HSA, 
- any additional relevant organisations e.g. agencies dealing with meteorological data, 
transport, environmental issues, agricultural issues, temporary food and accommodation, 
harbour authority etc ... 
In addition, the consultation process must ensure co-ordination between the off-site plan, on-
site plan and the information to be provided to the public. The manufacturer must be 
informed of the final co-ordinated off-site plan. The off-site plan must be reviewed and 
updated as required. 
The information to be included in the off-site plan is as follows: 
- details of how major accidents will be dealt with outside the establishment, 
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- details of coordination with other local authorities in the event of an accident, 
-names of those persons and their deputies authorised to implement and control the off-
site emergency plan. 
d) Information for the safety of the public 
The Regulations require that persons other than those working at Qle establishment who live 
and work in the vicinity of an installation subject to the specific requirements of the 
Regulations and are likely to be effected by a major accident should be informed as follows: 
- that the industrial activity has been notified to the HSA, 
- the nature of the major accident hazard, 
-safety measures and correct action to be adopted in the event of an accident. 
The specific information to be included in the information package is detailed 
in Appendix 6(b). 
The HSA guidelines recognise the following three groups within the general public as 
particularly relevant: 
i) Members of the public who live in or are likely to be in the relevant vicinity of the 
installation. They particularly note those in schools, hospitals etc. The Health Board are 
currently working on making provisions for specific risk groups such as the disabled and 
immobile. 
ii) People working in other industries in the vicinity of the installation. 
iii) Persons with specific duties to perform in the event of an emergency e.g. 
Local Competent Authorities emergency services. 
The recommended methods of information dissemination for the first group include the post, 
leaflets, notices, local papers and other methods to ensure the maximum target audience in 
homes are reached. For those travelling by car, bus etc. during an emergency, methods such 
as notices supported by flashing beacons are suggested. 
It is the manufacturers responsibility to provide this information although the manufacturer 
has the option of arranging an agreement such that the Local Competent Authorities will 
provide the information. However, research indicates that this option has never been used. 
Any relevant provisions of the off-site plan should be considered in doing so. This 
information should be prepared without the persons concerned requesting it and should be 
available to any person on request. 
The HSA guide to the Regulations stress that the information should be provided as a 
precautionary measure to prepare the public for possible major accidents and should not be 
provided only when things go wrong. 
2.4.1.3 Notification of a Major Accident 
A major accident is defined as an occurrence such as a major emission, fire or explosion 
resulting from uncontrolled developments in the course of an industrial activity, leading to a 
serious danger to man or the environment and involving one or more "dangerous substances" 
(as defined in the Regulations). 
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Pursuant to Regulation 21, the manufacturer must inform the HSA when a major accident 
occurs. They must include information as follows: 
- circumstances of the accident, 
- the dangerous substances involved, 
- data available for assessing the effects of the accident on man and the environment, 
- emergency measures taken, 
- steps envisaged to alleviate any short/long term effects of the accident and prevent 
any recurrence. 
The HSA should provide the Local Competent Authorities with the necessary information on 
the accident so they can review their off-site plans. Other persons having information on the 
occurrence/analysis of the accident should provide it on request to the HSA. 
Under Regulation 22, if the plant (whole/part) is deemed by the HSA to have caused the 
accident, the HSA require the manufacturer to examine and report to the HSA. This report 
should include: 
- the name and qualifications of persons conducting the examination, manner in which it 
was carried out, and method used in making tests 
- any defect accounting for the incident, 
- other matters as specified by the HSA. 
Under Regulation 23 when an accident occurs the HSA may get an inspector to make a 
Special Report" on the accident or part of it. The HSA may make this available to the Local 
Competent Authority and may decide to make it public. 
Under Regulation 24, the HSA has the power to direct a ''formal investigation" into: 
- the causes and circumstances of the accident, and 
- alleged failure of the Local Competent Authority to perform its required functions. 
The investigating tribunal are appointed to direct the investigation and report to the HSA. 
Under Regulation 25 an inquest must be done in case of death. 
Under Regulation 26, when a "notifiable incident" (as defined in the 8th Schedule of the 
Regulation) occurs the manufacturer must inform the HSA. The manufacturer must keep a 
register including information as detailed for notification of a major accident under 
Regulation 21b. The information on this register must be kept for at least 10 years after the 
incident. 
2.4.1.4 Confidentiality 
There are specific provisions in the Regulations to protect the confidentiality of specified 
information given by the manufacturer to the Central and Local Competent Authorities. 
2.4.2. The Major Emergency Plan and the "Seveso Regulations" 
The Major Emergency Plan Framework is intended to comply with the "Seveso Regulations" 
and to provide a basis for preparation of off-site emergency plans. As described in 2.4.1 
above, the HSA notify the Local Competent Authorities of the existence of an installation 
subject to the provisions of this Regulation, which is located in their functional area. Each 
Local Competent Authority must prepare an off-site plan relevant to their specific service. 
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They communicate with each other during preparation of the plans so that an integrated 
approach is achieved. The off- site plans should be co-ordinated with the on-site plan 
prepared by the manufacturer. All the plans should co-ordinate such that they are 
complementary parts of a single overall plan which will be the basis for the response to a 
major accident, in line with the provisions of the MEP. 
In most cases, the emergency planning provisions required under the Seveso Regulations" 
would form an appendix to the MEP or a separate plan which is cross referenced to the MEP. 
The respective installation(s) are listed in the appendix of the MEP with the required 
information relating to emergencies in each of the installations. 
In addition, other hazardous (non-Seveso) installations to which the plan applies are listed in 
an appendix to the plan. 
2.4.2.1 The Cork Emergency Planning Group 
In order to implement the Local Competent Authority requirements under the Seveso 
Regulations" within their functional area, the Southern Health Board formed the Cork 
Emergency Planning Group. 
This group consists of representatives (at operational level) from the Local Competent 
Authorities relevant to the functional area and has approval and consultation from the HSA. 
Within the functional area consisting of counties Cork and Kerry there are six installations 
which are subject to the provisions of the Seveso Regulations". The purpose of the Group was 
to enable the relevant Local Competent Authorities, as a group, to consult with each of the six 
manufacturers individually about relevant aspects of the on-site plans, off-site plans, 
information to the public and to ensure integration of the three as necessary. It was considered 
that this approach was more effective both in terms of non-duplications of information and 
co-ordination, rather than each Local Competent Authority meeting separately with each 
manufacturer. 
The Group annually checks the information package available to the public and ensures it is 
distributed regularly. A review of the requirements under the Regulations has recently 
commenced in the region and the six manufacturers have been requested to resubmit copies 
of their on-site plans and information packages, to the group. After review the group will 
discuss their findings with the manufacturers individually. 
2.4.3 Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act, 1989 
The general safety and health provisions of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act, 
1989 (17) and Safety, Health and Welfare at Work (General Applications) Regulations, 
1993 (18) are relevant to emergency planning and response. While this legislation does not 
deal specifically with dangerous substances, it deals with the duties of the employer to ensure 
the health and safety of employees. These duties are proactive accident prevention measures. 
In particular the following duties are included: 
- risk assessment of risks to safety and health at work, 
- proactive and preventative measures, 
- emergency procedures e.g. emergency provisions for evacuation, equipment, training, 
first aid and medical resources etc .. 
- information on the health and safety at work e.g risks, proactive and preventative 
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measures, emergency procedures, notified accidents and dangerous occurrences, 
- training on relevant health and safety issues. 
Pursuant to Part X of the Regulations, the HSA must be notified of accidents and dangerous 
occurrences in the work place as follows: 
- work accidents causing the death of an employee, 
- work accidents preventing an employee from working for more than three days, 
- an accident caused by a work activity which causes the death of, or 
requires medical treatment to, a person not at work. 
Dangerous occurrences relevant to dangerous substances which must be notified include: 
- explosion or fire, 
- escape of substances, 
- incidents occurring from the transport of substances by road, 
- failure of breathing apparatus, 
- failure of a freight container. 
2.4.4 Transportation of Dangerous Substances 
The transport of dangerous chemical substances in Ireland is regulated and controlled by 
specific statutory provisions. 
The international arrangements applicable to the transport of dangerous substances in Ireland 
are as follows: 
Rail 
Road -
Air 
Sea 
RID 
European Agreement concerning the International 
Carriage of Dangerous goods by road (ADR) (in the process of 
implementation) 
International Air Transport Association (IAT A), 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) 
International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG) 
The main legislation controlling the conveyance of dangerous substances in Ireland is the 
Dangerous Substances Act 1972 (19) and the Regulations made under it. The Act provides 
that those engaged in, amongst other things, the conveyance of dangerous substances must 
take all practical steps to present risk of injury to persons or property. 
Pursuant to the Dangerous Substances Act, 1972 (Part IV Declaration) Order, 1980 
(20) a list of twenty five substances were listed in a schedule as dangerous. S.I. No. 236 of 
1980 was revoked by the Dangerous Substances Act, 1972 (Part IV Declaration) Order 
(21), 1986 which declared a wide range of substances as dangerous, included in which are 
most of the classes within the scope of the ADR. 
2.4.4.1 Road Transport 
The following regulations cover the conveyance of the Scheduled Substances declared 
dangerous under the Dangerous Substance declaration orders 1980 and 1986 respectively: 
·Dangerous Substances (Conveyance of Scheduled Substances by Road) 
(Trade or Business) Regulations, 1980 (S.I. No. 235 of 1980) (22) 
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-Dangerous substances (Conveyance of Scheduled substances by Road) 
(Trade or Business) (Amendment) Regulations, 1986 (S.I. No. 268 of 1986) (23). 
These Regulations are enforced by the HSA who in co-operation with the Garda Siochana 
carry out regular road checks as part of the enforcement procedure. 
These Regulations apply to dangerous goods of a specified quantity and transported only for 
business or trade purposes. Only those goods permitted under the ADR may be transported. 
The carrier of the dangerous substances must obtain a certificate (Transport Document) for 
each load from the consigner identifying the substances carried and detailing the emergency 
procedures in the event of a mishap. The contents of the certificate is detailed in Appendix 7 
(a). Transport Emergency Cards (Tremcards) published by the European Council of Chemical 
Manufacturers Federation (CEFIC) may be used to fulfil part of the certification 
requirements, as described in Appendix 7(a). In Ireland the text of Tremcards is available 
from the Federation of Irish Chemical Industries (FICI). The Tremcard should be attached to 
the certificate to comply with the Regulations. 
The labelling and packaging of dangerous substances should follow the provisions specified 
in either: 
-the ADR, or 
- the European Communities (Dangerous Substances) (Classification, Packaging and 
Labelling) Regulations 1979 (24) as amended in 1980, 1983, 1984, 1986, and 1988, 
-the European Communities (Dangerous Substances) (Classification, Packaging, 
Labelling and Notification) Regulations 1982, as amended in 1985 (25), 
- the European Communities (Dangerous Preparations) (Solvents) (Classification and 
Labelling) Regulations 1983 (26), 
-the European Communities (Classification, Packaging and Labelling of Pesticides) 
Regulations, 1983 (27) 
- IMDG Code (IMO). 
Vehicles carrying scheduled substances or their residues must display plates and labels as 
required under the ADR. The Regulations also allow the use of other signs approved by the 
Minister of Labour. The UK hazard information system (UKHIS), commonly called 
Hazchem, has been approved for the conveyance of scheduled substances in tanks and tank 
containers only. When conveying dangerous goods in packages only, the ADR plates are 
used. Labels on individual packages must comply with EC Classification, Packaging and 
Labelling (CPL) legislation. 
The Southern Health Board produce an Emergency Services Hazcard for use by the 
emergency services and other relevant bodies. The Hazcard illustrates the following labelling 
and identification systems used in Ireland: 
- Hazard Warning Labels 
- HAZCHEM 
- ADRJRID Identification Labels 
- EC Package Labelling System. 
A copy of the Hazcard is located in Appendix 7(b). A recent development in the distribution 
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of Hazcards is to include labelling information in the Automobile Association (AA) drivers 
handbook. The aim of this is to make the motorist aware and able to identify vehicles 
transporting dangerous substances. 
As part of the implementation of ADR in Ireland, the Directive 89/684/EEC on driver 
training has been implemented by the European Communities (Vocational training of 
drivers of vehicles carrying Dangerous Goods) Regulations 1992 (28). The HSA approve 
the associated driver training courses and assist the Department of Transport, Energy and 
Communications in conducting the associated examinations. 
2.4.4.2 Rail Transport 
In Ireland there are three main rail routes transporting dangerous chemical substances. These 
are as follow: 
a) Methyl acrylate and Acrylonitrile are transported from a Dublin port to Ballina (County 
Mayo) train station and then by road to its destination in Killala (County Mayo). 
b) Anhydrous ammonia is transported from Cobh (County Cork) to Arklow (County 
Wicklow). 
c) Petrol is transported from Dublin to Sligo. 
The transport of dangerous chemical substances by train is controlled and regulated by special 
rules and procedures. Tankers, tank containers or freight containers are fitted with appropriate 
l.abcls. as follows: 
a) the appropriate RID hazard label (equivalent to the U.N. labels identifying risks, e.g. 
inflammable, toxic etc.) 
b) Kemler' plate as defined under the European Marking System (ADR). 
c) Hazchem labels. 
d) Tremcards 
In addition, train crews are provided with emergency equipment and carry Tremcards. 
The emergency planning and response provisions for the transport of dangerous substances by 
rail are catered for by the procedures laid down in the following documents: 
a) Scheme for Alert and Co-ordination of Emergency Services (and other 
Organisations) in the Event of an Incident/Accident involving Dangerous Substances 
in Transit by (a) Rail, or (b) a Combination of Rail and Road or (c) Portal Tramway 
(or Uncleaned Tank Cars, Tank Containers, or other Receptacles which had 
Contained such Substances) (29) 
b) Major Emergency Plans for all relevant emergency services. 
The scheme and the Major Emergency Plans are co-ordinated and reference each other. The 
scheme is designed to ensure no conflict between the emergency services response. 
The scheme was developed by the Inter-Departmental Committee dealing with the 
Transportation of Hazardous Substances by Rail. The committee members are 
representative of all the appropriate organisations as follows: 
1 Government Departments 
- Department of Transport, Energy and Communications 
- Department of Defence 
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- Department of the Environment 
-Department of Health 
n Emergency Services in regions relevant to the train routes: 
-Garda Siochana 
-Health Boards 
- Local Authorities 
iii Iarnrod Eireann (Irish Rail) 
iv HSA 
v Relevant Manufacturers/users 
vi Dublin Port and Docks Board. 
The scheme and its interaction with the relevant MEPs has been tested on a number of 
occasions by both field and desk top exercises involving all the relevant organisations. The 
provisions are reviewed as necessary based on feedback from exercises, incident/accidents 
and experience from international incidents and policies. 
The Garda Siochana divisions relevant to the train routes have developed specific plans 
detailing the logistical provisions for gaining access to each mile of railway track along each 
route. Therefore, in the event of an emergency, once the location of the incident is 
established, the access route to the nearest mile is readily available. These plans cross refer to 
the MEP. 
All relevant emergency services are aware of the scheduled train times for dangerous goods 
transport. In the event of a large public gathering (e.g. football match) in the vicinity of the 
train route, the trains are rescheduled to avoid the area and the emergency services are 
informed. 
Pursuant to the Railway Regulation Act 1871, all incidents/accidents involving trains 
carrying dangerous substances must be notified to the Minister for Transport, Energy and 
Communications. Under this Act, inspections may be authorised for any railway accident and 
formal investigations for serious accidents are provided for. 
There have been no accidents involving the rail transport of dangerous chemical substances 
requiring formal investigations. Minor incidents/accidents have been investigated by 
appointed inspectors, but none of these resulted in any significant loss/damage. 
2.5 ROLES PLAYED BY THE ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED IN 
EMERGENCY PLANNING AND RESPONSE 
This section is to summarise the roles played by specific organisations throughout the 
emergency planning and response lifecycle e.g. 
- pre-incident/accident 
- during incident/accident 
- post incident/accident. 
2.5.1 Central Government 
The Departments of the Environment, Health, Justice and Defence are part of the Inter-
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Departmental Committee on Peacetime Emergency Planning and as such determine 
emergency planning policy at central government level. This Committee monitors and 
advises as necessary on co-ordinating energency planning arrangements at national level to 
facilitate the response of the emergency services. Individually, the departments function in an 
advisory capacity to guide the emergency planning provisions of the Local Authorities, 
Health Boards and Garda Siochana respectively with respect to major emergency planning 
and their requirements under the "Seveso Regulations". 
In terms of rail transport of dangerous substances, these departments, in addition to the 
Department of Transport, Energy and Communications, the emergency services, HSA, 
industrial manufacturers and the port and docks board form the Inter- Departmental 
Committee dealing with the Transportation of Hazardous Substances by Rail. The 
Department of Transport, Energy and Communications and the Department of the Marine are 
respectively involved in the policy and legislation development associated with the transport 
of dangerous substances by road and sea respectively. 
2.5.2 Central Competent Authority • HSA 
The Process Industries Unit within the Specialised Services Directorate of the HSA deals 
with, inter alia, the prevention and control of major accidents and the enforcement of the 
"Seveso Regulations" in Ireland. 
As the Central Competent Authority implementing the "Seveso Regulations" the functions of 
the HSA are as follows: 
1 Examination and processing of notifications for installations subject to the regulations, 
u Notify Local Competent Authorities of the existence of relevant installations in their 
functional areas, consult with the Local Competent Authorities and ensure, if requested, 
that the information required to prepare an off-site plan is provided, 
iii Checking off-site plans, 
iv Be notified by the manufacturer of a major accident occurrence as specified in 
Regulation 21 and supply information to the local Competent Authority as they require 
to review their off-site plans. 
v In the event of a major accident occurrence, the HSA may require the manufacturer to 
have a report of the plant prepared if any plant may have caused the accident or a report 
may be obtained from a HSA inspector and made available to a Local Competent 
Authority. 
vi Appoint inspectors with power of entry to an industrial activity to inspect and request 
information. 
In terms of enforcement, the Competent Authority have the power to issue prohibition 
notices, notices specifying certain requirements to be met and obtain court orders. Substantial 
fines and prison sentences are also provided for in respect of breaches of the Regulations. 
Also within the Specialised Services Directorate is the Dangerous Substances Group. This 
group monitors, enforces and advises on application of the Dangerous Substances Act 1972 
and the various Regulations made under it relating to retail and private petroleum stores, 
petroleum bulk stores, oil jetties, the conveyance of dangerous substances and the storage of 
liquefied petroleum gas. 
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The HSA is also the Competent Authority responsible for implementing Directive 
88/379/EEC on the Classification, Packaging, Labelling and Notification of Dangerous 
Substances and for the approval of training courses for drivers of vehicles carrying dangerous 
goods as specified under ADR. 
Both the Process Industries Unit and the Dangerous Substances Act Group were consulted 
with respect to the fixed installation and transport accidents analysed in this study. 
2.5.3 Local Competent Authorities 
Pre-Incident 
Each Local Competent Authority in each functional area prepares a Major Emergency Plan 
and where installations subject to the specific requirements of the "Seveso Regulations" exist, 
an off-site plan for each site. These plans are co-ordinated during preparation to ensure an 
integrated, effective response to a major emergency by the Co-ordinating Group. Training for 
the emergency services is provided as required. Desk top and field exercises are performed to 
test the plans with representatives from all Local Competent Authorities taking part as 
relevant. The emergency plans are updated based on feed back from exercises, 
incidents/accidents in Ireland and abroad and to account for any changes/modifications which 
may effect the emergency planing and response procedures. 
During Incident/Accident 
The response of the emergency services to a "major emergency" involving dangerous 
substances is dictated by either: 
-the Major Emergency Plan and off-site plan (for "Seveso" installations) 
-the Major Emergency Plan (for road transport accidents) 
- the Major Emergency Plan and the Scheme (for rail transport accidents) 
In terms of their response to a major emergency, each Local Competent Authority has 
specific roles as detailed in the overall Major Emergency Plan provisions and in their 
individual pre-determined arrangements. Each emergency service carries out their functions 
in accordance with these provisions and arrangements. The specific emergency services do 
not have responsibility for services not under their control. Each emergency service must 
ensure they are adequately prepared to discharge their functions. The specific functions of 
each of the Local Competent Authorities as determined in the major emergency framework 
are detailed below: 
A. Local Authority 
The Local Authority shall carry out the following functions: 
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1. activation of this plan, 
2. extinction of fires, 
3. containment, neutralisation and clearance of chemical spills and emissions, 
4. protection and rescue of persons and property, 
5. maintenance of local authority services (e.g. roads, fire cover, protection of water 
supplies) during the emergency, 
6. provision of access to the site of the emergency, (securing the site and control of 
access is a function of the Garda Siochana), 
7. forensic support for Garda Siochana, 
8. advice on evacuation, 
9. accommodation and welfare of evacuees and persons displaced by the emergency, 
10. site clearance, demolition, clear-up operations, removal and disposal of debris, (this 
should be done in consultation with Garda Siochana to avoid the possible unnecessary 
destruction of evidence.), 
11. provision of food and rest facilities for personnel responding to the emergency, 
12. control and direction of activities of all agencies within the Danger Area" at an 
emergency, 
13. participation in the Co-ordinating Group. 
B. Health Boards 
The Health Board shall carry out the following functions: 
1. activation of this plan, 
2. provision of all health services, 
3. provision of medical advice and assistance, 
4. assessment of casualties and determination of priorities for their evacuation, 
5. casualty evacuation and ambulance transport, 
6. certification of the dead and provision of forensic support for the Garda Siochana, 
7. provision of first aid together with basic life support and treatment at the scene if 
required, 
8. provision of hospital treatment including psychiatric assistance, 
9. provision of community, medical and welfare services, 
10. participation in Co-ordinating Group. 
C. Garda Siochana 
The Garda Siochana shall carry out the following functions:-
1. activation of this plan, 
2. maintenance of law and order, 
3. evacuation, 
4. traffic and crowd control, 
5. preservation of scene and collection of evidence, (precedence should only be given to 
this activity where it will not interfere with activities of agencies responding to an 
emergency which are concerned with the protection of life and the prevention and 
treatment of casualties. 
6. arrangements in respect of the dead, 
7. provision of a casualty information service at the site, 
8. establishment at the site of an information centre for use by the agencies responding to 
the emergency, 
9. request Telecom Eireann to provide an emergency telephone service, if necessary, in 
accordance with pre-determined arrangements, 
10. securing the site and layout thereof and controlling access thereto, 
11. exercise of certain local authority functions pending a local authority response to an 
emergency, (the Senior Garda Officer on site is empowered to exercise local authority 
functions pursuant to Section 27 of the Fire Services Act, 1981.), 
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12. informing the public as necessary and on the advice of the competent authorities of 
actual or potential dangers arising from the emergency, 
13. participation in the Co-ordinating Group. 
At the scene of an incident/accident involving dangerous substances the emergency services 
approach the scene as detailed in their emergency plans. The information available at the 
scene is used to identify the dangerous substance involved and the response to be taken is 
determined by access to systems such as Chemdata and/or expert advice. All the Local 
Competent Authorities have access to chemical databases e.g. Chemdata, either on-line or in 
manuals. Several divisions of the Local Competent Authorities have portable facilities. All 
emergency services carry information as detailed in the Hazcards. In addition, the Garda 
Siochana and fire services use an Emergency Response Guidebook: Guidebook for Initial 
Response to Hazardous Material Incidents (30) which provides information on potential 
hazards and the appropriate action to be taken for a wide variety of dangerous substances. All 
measures are taken to avoid environmental degradation resulting either from a dangerous 
substance spillage as well as the clean up operation. As required, the Local Authority 
Environmental Services are called to determine whether any environmental damage has 
occurred as a result of the dangerous substances spillage or the clean up. 
2.5.4 Industry 
Federation of Irish Chemical Industries ( FICI) 
FICI represents a wide variety of industries based mainly on chemicals and operates on the 
basis of four Industry groups: Pharmaceutical and Health, Chemical, Cosmetics, Toiletries 
and Household Maintenance Products and Agricultural Chemicals. FICI plays a pro-active 
role both in the prevention of accidents involving chemical substances and the emergency 
response to them. 
As part of the Responsible Care Programme, FICI members are active in the establishment 
of industrial practices which protect the health and safety of employees, customers, the public 
and the environment. As part of this programme investigations, reporting and follow-up 
procedures are initiated after an accident. The Federation are currently developing a format to 
disseminate information on any accidents at FICI sites and the lessons learnt from them to the 
other Companies within the Federation. 
In terms of the transport of dangerous substances, FICI have produced a publication entitled 
Code of Practice for the Transport of Hazardous Chemicals by Road (1985 and 1993 
versions) (31) for all FICI members. 
FICI, in conjunction with the Department of the Environment, has devised a new, coordinated 
and markedly improved Emergency Response Scheme. The Scheme provides for voluntary 
assistance to the emergency services by strategically located participating chemical 
companies having a range of technical resources, throughout the country. Under the Response 
Scheme, the Emergency Services will be assured of a structured response by the best 
available expertise, closest to the scene of an accident, so as to optimise the assistance which 
the industry can provide to the emergency services. The Scheme applies to all road incidents 
involving the products of participating chemical suppliers and as such will cover the majority 
of hazardous substances currently transported on Irish roads. 
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The Manufacturer: 
The manufacturer at an installation subject to the specific requirements of the Seveso 
Regulations" is responsible for notifying the HSA, preparing an on-site plan and providing 
the required information to the Local Competent Authorities to enable preparation of the off-
site plan. In addition they must provide an information package for the safety of the public in 
the vicinity of the site. The manufacturers must consult with the Competent Authority and 
Local Competent Authorities as required to ensure the co-ordination of the on-site plan, off-
site plans and information package. Transporters of dangerous substances must ensure they 
meet the legislative requirements set out in section 2.4.4. 
During the incident, the manufacturer decides the necessary initial response, activates their 
emergency plans including the on-site plan if necessary and co- operates with the emergency 
services. Specified personnel must be available to provide their expertise if required during 
the emergency response. In the MEP specific provisions are detailed to contact these experts 
and where relevant, accompany them to the accident scene. In regions with installations 
subject to the Seveso Regulations" or chemical rail transport, the emergency services have 
good communications with the manufacturers and are acquainted with them. Many of the 
larger industrial sites have their own emergency fire brigade which will be activated if 
required. 
2.5.5 The Irish Marine Emergency Service 
The Irish Marine Emergency Service (IMES) is a division within the Department of the 
Marine directly responsible for handling marine emergencies - including those involving 
dangerous substances. IMES assumes direct responsibility for maritime safety, rescue, 
shipwreck, sea and coastal pollution. In the event of an emergency the aims of IMES in order 
of priority are: 
- Search and Rescue, 
- Counter pollution, 
-Salvage. 
IMES use the C-Bell (Dutch system) information systems and the Hazchem labelling systems 
as required, for accidents involving dangerous substances. 
IMES have developed their own major emergency provisions, which is structurally similar to 
the MEP framework. 
One of the groups within IMES are the Marine Pollution Response Team (MPRT). MPRT are 
available should a major pollution incident occur, involving the spillage of oil, chemicals or 
dangerous substances at sea which threatens the pollution of the Irish coastline. IMES and 
MRPT work closely with each other. The MPRT meet regularly to discuss relevant matters 
such as training, technology updates, accident responses, counter pollution equipment etc. 
MPRT are also available to provide advice and assistance to the Local Authorities with 
respect to the on-shore cleaning of oil, chemical and dangerous substances pollution. 
2.5.6 Poisons Information Centre, (e.g. Beaumont Hospital, Dublin) 
The centre provides information on poisons including drugs, household and industrial 
chemicals. In the event of an incident/accident the information centre is available to provide 
information on exposure to dangerous substances, treatment required and appropriate 
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procedures to adopt. They would be listed as an information source for poisons denoted in the 
emergency plans of organisations. 
2.5. 7 Other Relevant Organisations 
Additional relevant agencies who may play a role in the response to a major emergency are 
referenced as required in each MEP. The groups may include Local Competent Authorities in 
an adjacent functional area, utilities, etc. This reference maybe in the form of a contact 
number/location or a reference to emergency provisions specified by the agency. The 
following organisations may be included in this context: 
Army 
Civil Defence 
Harbour Commissioners 
Irish Rail 
Irish Bus 
Electricity Supply Board 
Irish Helicopters. 
Irish Marine Emergency Service 
Meteorological Service 
Telecomm Eireann 
Community Welfare Officers 
Bord Gais Eireann (Irish Gas Board) 
Red Cross Society 
2.6 COMMUNICATIONS 
Communications is an essential part of the emergency planning and response system. In this 
section the communications framework under the following headings will be considered: 
1 Communications between the emergency services 
2 Information dissemination to the public and media 
3 Telecommunications. 
2.6.1 Communications between the emergency services 
In preparation of all emergency plans the Local Competent Authorities consult as required 
with all other relevant organisations to ensure an integrated approach to a major emergency. 
The Co-ordinating Group for each functional area and the Cork Planning Group for the 
Cork/Kerry functional area are active in this co-ordinating role. Training programmes, 
emergency exercise simulations, and meetings provide excellent vehicles for communication 
and feed-back between the emergency services. In Ireland, the functional areas are small 
enough that the emergency services personnel become acquainted. 
Each of the Local Competent Authorities specifies a Controller of Operations in there 
respective MEPs. The designated Controller of Operations for each emergency service 
provides overall control, direction and co-ordination of the activities of each respective 
emergency service at the scene of a major emergency. However, if a Danger Area has been 
established the senior fire brigade officer has overall control within this area. 
In the event of a major emergency, the Co-ordinating Group may be convened at the 
discretion of any of the group following activation of the MEP. The Co-ordinating Group do 
not become involved in the detailed on site response. There function during a major 
emergency is as follows: 
-monitoring the activities of all agencies responding to the emergency, 
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- maintaining liaison between the agencies, 
- arranging for the mobilisation of additional resources as required, 
- giving directions and policy decisions as required, 
- facilitating the distribution of information to the media and the general public. 
2.6.2 Telecommunications 
The primary source of communications is via radio with backup from the Telecomm Eireann 
public telephone network and Eircell (Irish commercial cellular radio telephone system) 
phones. The designated emergency services have regional mobile radio systems. These are 
used to communicate data from the accident site. In addition, portable radio systems (walkie 
talkie) are used at the accident site. Depending upon the region, the emergency services have 
arrangements with Telecom Eireann for the provisions of extra lines and dedicated lines in 
the event of a major emergency. Several large industrial sites also have provisions for 
dedicated and additional lines. Eircell phones are used as a backup system. Lessons learnt 
from other countries indicate problems with communication via cellular systems as the lines 
become quickly overcrowded. As the technology in this area develops, there is scope for 
further investigation in this area. 
At the emergency scene each emergency service should establish a control centre with 
portable radio communications facilities which are intrinsically safe and co-ordinated. 
2.6.3 Information dissemination to the Public and Media 
At a minimum the following information should generally be provided to the public: 
-Nature of emergency and (likely) consequences, 
- Advice on the actions and behaviour the public should or should not take, 
- Details - updated as necessary - of measures being taken by the emergency services, 
- Emergency telephone numbers which can be contacted for further information. 
Account should be taken of the fact that in an emergency situation such numbers may 
be crowed by callers which, to some extent, may limit their usefulness. 
The Report on Peacetime Emergency Planning identifies three stages of information 
provision to the public as follows: 
1 Prior notification (where possible) 
2 During an emergency the public and media should be informed of the status of the 
situation and action being taken by the emergency services 
3 Post emergency liaison should be maintained with the public and media to provide 
suitable advice (where necessary) and information (e.g. traffic updates, casualty 
reports etc.). 
Emergency planning must include appropriate systems for notifying the public and 
mechanisms for doing so. Systems for co-ordinating with the media to provide 
communication facilities e.g. radio and television, are pre-arranged and defined in the MEP. 
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To facilitate the dissemination of information to the media and general public the Garda 
Siochana establish an information centre at the site of a major emergency for use by the other 
relevant agencies. Each agency designates an information officer with specific roles and 
responsibilities. As detailed in Section 2.3.1. 2(d) - Information for the Safety of the Public, 
installations subject to the specific requirements of the "Seveso Regulations" must provide an 
information package to all those living and working in the vicinity of the site. Manufacturers 
liase with the relevant emergency services and the HSA on a regular basis to review and 
update this information as necessary. 
2. 7 FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
2. 7.1 Combined Emergency Plan 
Currently in each functional area, each emergency service has a Major Emergency Plan and 
an off-site emergency plan for each installation subject to the specific requirements of the 
"Seveso Regulations" (if there is an installation in that area). The plans are Co-ordinated by 
the Co-ordinating Group in each area. There have been initiatives to move away from the co-
ordinated multiple plans to a single combined plan. As an example, this has been a recent 
initiative in the Cork region to form a single combined plan. 
The Major Emergency Plan for the Cork region only, consists of the following: 
1 Southern Health Board Major Accident Plan 
1 Cork County Council Major Emergency Plan 
1 Cork Corporation Major Emergency Plan 
1 Garda Siochiana Major Emergency Plan. 
In theory these plans are co-ordinated by the Co-ordinating Group and Cork Emergency 
Planning Group to avoid incompatabilities. However there are also gaps and incompatibilities 
as a result of the four separate plans which are co-ordinated to form the MEP for the Cork 
region. Therefore, there is currently an initiative being developed to revert to a single 
combined Major Emergency Plan for this area. 
This combined plan, called the "Cork Region Emergency Plan", is based on the Southern 
Health Board plan with the other emergency services feeding into this plan. The combined 
plan is currently in its final draft stages and will be reviewed for final approval in the near 
future. 
Overall, MEPs are becoming simpler and shorter and referencing the details in the form of 
PDAs. 
2. 7.2 Transport 
The inter-departmental committee dealing with the transportation of Hazardous Substances 
by Rail is currently considering a proposal by Iarnod Eireann to transport approximately 
thirty dangerous chemical substances. They propose to transport these on goods trains with 
one wagon of dangerous goods per train. If such a proposal were accepted the scheme would 
have to be adapted to cater for the increased loads and resulting hazards. 
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3. ACCIDENTS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In conjunction with the HSA, a number of fixed installation and transport accidents were 
selected for analysis. Fortunately, very few major accidents involving dangerous substances 
have occurred in Ireland, therefore the choice of accidents for analysis was limited in the first 
instance. 
For the purposes of this study it was endeavoured to select serious accidents which illustrate 
lessons relevant to emergency planning and response. It should be noted that the accidents 
analysed are not the norm. In most cases the accidents are minor and have been responded to 
efficiently and quickly to avoid escalation of the situation. 
Through meetings with the relevant manufacturers, Local Competent Authorities, HSA, 
central government bodies and other relevant organisations, the accident information was 
collated. Data on the following aspects of the accidents was compiled: 
- Pre-planning 
- Accident/Incident description 
- Emergency Response 
- Post accident actions 
-Information dissemination to the public and media 
- Lessons learnt following the accident. 
Unfortunately, some information was difficult to obtain due to confidentiality restrictions, 
unavailability of official records of investigation and people originally involved in the 
accidents being no longer available for comment. However, much useful and accurate 
information was obtained specifically from the manufacturers involved and the relevant 
emergency services directly involved in the accidents. The manufacturers of installations 
subject to the "Seveso Regulations" were particularily co-operative. Press and media reports 
were used only as a backup to the definite factual information, as media reports may be 
inaccurate. 
A quick reference list of the accidents chosen for study are detailed in section 3.2 below. 
3.2. LIST OF ACCIDENTS 
A. Fixed Installation 
LOCATION 
Cork 
Shannon 
Cork 
Dublin 
DATE 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
INCIDENT 
Gas Explosion 
Pilot plant explosion 
Distillation Plant Explosion 
Powder Explosion 
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B. Transport Accidents 
LOCATION DATE INCIDENT 
Cork 1979 Explosion and Fire on a ship and 
offshore jetty 
Tuam 1985 Full tanker spillage of petrol 
Robertstown 1985 Diesil oil spillage 
Meath 1985 Hexane tanker collision with car 
Kilkenny 1986 Hydrofluoric acid spill - drum 
fell off vehicle 
Cork-Dublin Road 1987 Phthalic Anhydride spillage 
Slane 1988 Sodium Hydroxide spillage 
Donegal 1988 Petrol explosion and fire 
Cork 1988 Formic acid leakage from drum 
following traffic accident 
Tipperary 1989 Full tanker spillage of Creosote 
Mayo 1991 Tank container of Acrylonitrile fell 
off vehicle 
Lei trim 1991 Chromium Trioxide spillage. 
3.3 SUMMARY OF ACCIDENTS FOR ANALYSIS 
3.3.1 Fixed Installation 
The criteria used to chose the accidents for analysis was fixed installations (storage and 
process) subject to the provisions of the "Seveso Regulations" where accidents occurred 
involving dangerous substances, as defined in the Regulations. In Ireland, relatively few 
"major accidents", as defined in the Regulations, have occurred. In total four fixed installation 
accident case histories have been chosen for analysis in this study. Of these, only one "major 
accident" has occurred at a fixed installation which was subject to the specific requirements 
defined in Regulations 12 - 18 of S.I. 292 of 1986 (on-site emergency plans, off-site 
emergency plans and information to the public). The other three accidents occurred at sites 
subject to the general responsibilities defined in Regulations 9 & 10 of S.I. No. 292 of 1986. 
i Explosion at a fertiliser production plant, December 23, 1988, Cork Harbour 
The accident occurred at 12:25 hours on 23 December 1988. This was a holiday, therefore 
many staff members were not on site at the time. The incident involved the rupture of a 24" 
pipe due to fatigue/corrosion induced by thermal cycling. This rupture resulted in the release 
and ignition of hydrogen in synthesis gas. The original rupture caused further damage to 
adjacent piping which resulted in a minor ammonia release. The smell of ammonia was 
tolerable and dissipated. The initial explosion was followed by two separate fires - a methane 
fire and a hydrogen fire. 
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The site emergency procedures were activated. The natural gas (methane) supply to the plant 
was cut off and the plant shut down. 
There were no significant injuries and damage was largely confined to the plant. The noise 
caused by the explosion was reported up to a distance of a 10 mile radius from the plant. The 
main damage was in the immediate vicinity of the explosion and fire to pipework, vessels etc. 
Approximately 12 windows on site were broken and eight off-site claims ranging from 
damaged windows, roofs and slates in nearby houses were made. All damage to local 
residents property was fixed as soon as possible. 
The plant was subject to the specific responsibilities defined in Regulations 12 - 18 of S.I. 
No. 292 of 1986 (i.e. on-site emergency plan, off-site emergency plan and information to the 
public). 
The emergency pre-planning provisions in place were as follows: 
- internal site emergency plan 
- on-site emergency plan 
- off-site emergency plan. 
Local residents within a 1.5km radius of the site were provided with information packages as 
directed under the "Seveso Regulations". At the time of the accident the information was 
disseminated via the local newspaper every three months. 
In response to the emergency the site foreman set off the fire alarm, mobilised the internal 
fire brigade (as specified in the internal site emergency plan) and shut down the plant. The 
foreman decided that no external emergency services were required to handle the emergency 
(as is his function under the internal site emergency plan). The on-site and off-site emergency 
plans were not specifically activated as it was deemed by the company that this was not 
necessary. A system of call out for specific company personnel was activated and they arrived 
at the site a half hour after the incident occurred. 
Residents in the vicinity who heard the explosion telephoned the emergency services. The 
emergency services could not contact the site as all its phone lines were in use at the time. 
The emergency services activated the Major Emergency Plan based on the calls they received 
from residents and proceeded to the site. At the site the emergency services were not allowed 
entry by the site representative for safety reasons and because the internal staff had the 
situation under control. One fire brigade insisted on entry to the site and assembled 
themselves for emergency action. The manufacturer felt internal control of the emergency 
was best, as the fire brigade were not appropriately trained to deal specifically with the 
situation. The Garda Siochana controlled traffic for the site during the incident. 
Approximately two - three hours after the accident a Company representative made 
statements to the media and public on the status of the accident. The main purpose of this was 
to allay public fears. Soon after the accident (when safe) a communication programme was 
arranged. As part of this, local residents visited the accident site and were given a 
presentation to ensure them that there would be no further problems. 
The plant was closed for five weeks while investigations were conducted and the plant was 
re-established. Investigations by the HSA and external consultants were performed. Any 
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recommendations made were closely monitored by the HSA and the manufacturer during re-
establishment. Before the plant recommenced production, a report of the accident, relevant 
investigation results and starting date were placed by the manufacturer in the local 
newspaper. 
The incident constituted a "major accident" as defined in EC Directive 82/501/EEC, and was 
reported to the CEC under Article 11.1 of that Directive. 
ii Explosion and fire in a chemical manufacturers, 28 June 1989, Shannon 
At 16:30 hours on 28 June 1989 an explosion occurred in a plant manufacturing fine 
chemicals for the pharmaceutical industry. An operation to distil a crude nitro-imidazole 
compound at 100°C under a vacuum in laboratory trials had yielded a pure product. This 
operation was repeated at pilot scale and was performed in a 450 litre glass lined reactor. 
When the substance dissolved and the reactor agitator was activated a yellow fume emerged 
from the closed manlid. Due to a runaway reaction one explosion (blast approximately 2.5 kg 
TNT equivalent) occurred two seconds after the emergence of the fumes. The explosion was 
caused by the thermal decomposition of the material. The decomposition may have been 
promoted by Manganese Dioxide which accumulated as the product melted due to the design 
of the reactor used. Carbon Dioxide was also released in the explosion. A minor fire 
followed the explosion. 
Two employees were trapped in the area of the explosion and fire. These employees were 
safely removed from the area, but were suffering from shock. Damage to the plant was 
extensive amounting to 0.65 MECU. Windows within a radius of 30m were broken. 
The fire was already extinguished as a result of the internal site Fire Brigade action when the 
local fire brigade arrived on the scene. The Garda Siochana were also in attendance. 
A cloud of C02 moved to the evacuation meeting area and as a result the evacuees had to be 
moved to an alternative location. The scenario of a gas cloud resulting from am emission at 
the plant moving to the meeting place and the resultant impacts had not been considered in 
the internal site emergency planning provisions. Therefore, no provisions were available for 
this situation at the time. 
C02 and smoke due to the fire and explosion drifted slowly towards a near-by town, as a 
result of calm weather conditions. This caused public concern. Subsequent to the accident, a 
statement was given to the media, local residents and nearby industrial sites on the status of 
the accident. A representative from the plant appeared on national radio and TV to give the 
status of the accident. 
The installation process was subject only to the general duties as defined in Regulations 9 and 
10 of S.I. No. 292 of 1986. 
Broad Emergency planning provisions were in place prior to the accident, however in 
hindsight, the manufacturer realised they were not sufficiently detailed and did not have all 
necessary areas catered for. For example there were no liaison procedures with the emergency 
services and no provision for dealing with the public and media in the event of an emergency. 
While hazard identification assessments were done it was considered that not all potential 
hazards and scenarios had been formally identified. 
Subsequent to the accident the plant was shut for two weeks. Investigations were conducted 
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by the HSA and the manufacturer into the cause of the accident and recommendations were 
made. The implementation of the recommendations was monitored by the HSA. The local 
residents were kept informed and were invited to visit the site before it commenced 
operations again. 
The company were successfully prosecuted under S.I. No. 292 of 1986. 
iii Explosion at a Pharmaceutical manufacturers, 1 June 1990, Cork 
A vessel rupture occurred at 17:03 hours on a Friday, in the tank farm area of the plant. The 
rupture was due to an exothermic reaction between caustic and chloroform, which 
accidentally contaminated the system, was not able to vent and hence exploded rupturing the 
still. No fire followed the explosion. 
In response to the emergency, the Company emergency plan was activated. The specified 
alarms were activated and staff evacuated from the building. It was decided by the specified 
person in charge, that the Fire Brigade was not required and that it was appropriate for the 
staff on site to investigate the damage initially. This decision was based on the fact that the 
incident was the result of vessel rupture with no danger of fire. The Fire Brigade were 
notified of the accidents the following Monday. The Fire Brigade believed they should have 
been contacted immediately after the accident occurred. The Local Authority Environmental 
Engineer and the HSA were contacted immediately due to the possibility of potential 
environmental damage. 
The neighbouring site was also informed of the accident and kept updated with any 
developments. The day following the accident (Saturday) the secretary of the residents 
committee was informed of the details of the accident and that no threat was posed to the 
public. 
There were no casualties, but staff sprayed with material, as a result of the explosion, were 
examined by the site First Aid team. They were advised to see their local doctor. There was 
extensive damage to the tank farm area of the plant. 
The installation process was subject only to the general duties as defined in Regulations 9 and 
10 of S.I. No. 292 of 1986. 
Prior to the accident, the company had internal emergency and evacuation provisions in 
place. These included the procedures to be followed by the site personnel in an emergency 
and provisions for contacting the Emergency Services. The site has its own internal fire 
service. Specific hazard identification assessments had not been formally conducted and there 
was no system of information dissemination to the public as this was not a legal requirement. 
Subsequent to the accident production of one of the main products manufactured at the plant 
was suspended for six months because of the accident. Investigations of the accident were 
carried out by the HSA, the manufacturer and external consultants. Recommendations were 
made and have all been implemented. This implementation is monitored by the HSA. 
iv Powder explosion at a chemical manufacturing plant, 17 March 1991, County 
Dublin 
A powder explosion occurred at a chemical manufacturing plant at approximately 10:00 
hours, on March 17, 1991, which was a public holiday in Ireland. However, the plant was 
manned on a twenty-four hour basis. The explosion was caused by the decomposition of 
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600kg of an organic disulfide. This material became damp and on heating underwent an 
exothermic reaction. The manufacturer was not aware of this reaction. The operation 
involving this material was a minor part of the production process at the site and only small 
amounts of the material were used. A fire ball went through the plant accompanying the 
explosion which resulted in superficial burns to plant materials in the immediate vicinity. The 
explosion and fireball lasted only a few minutes. 
Two people were in the immediate vicinity of the explosion but were not injured. No injuries 
resulted from the accident but the roof was blown off the production area. 
The installation process was subject to the general duties defined in Regulation 9 and 10 of 
S.l. 292 of 1986. A comprehensive internal site emergency plan was in place considering all 
aspects of emergency procedures for the entire plant and all employees. Material Safety Data 
Sheet (MSDS) for all materials in use and relevant site maps and plans were included. 
Procedures for providing information to the media and other relevant outside agencies were 
also included. The Emergency Plan was regularly updated and kept in the security hut at the 
entrance to the premises for access by the Emergency Services. 
An internal fire crew and specified personnel were trained to deal with accidents at the site. 
Exercises were performed twice yearly. An internal hazard identification procedure and 
internal auditing system were in place at the site. 
In response to the incident the internal site emergency plan was used as specified in the 
emergency plan. There was a site fire crew and the fire brigade were called to the emergency. 
The sprinkler system put out any potential fires. 
The Emergency Plan was deemed to have worked well. The Material Safety Data Sheets for 
the material involved specify that care must be taken to avoid environmental contamination 
when disposing of this product. No environmental damage or health risks were caused as a 
result of the accident. All run-off water from the sprinklers was contained in the effluent 
treatment plant. 
After the accident, an information programme was implemented to provide information to the 
HSA, Department of Health, Local Politicians and local residents, in that order of priority. 
Local residents were invited to visit the plant and were given a description of the incident and 
reassured that it would not happen again. 
Post accident investigations were carried out by the HSA, the manufacturer and external 
consultants. The plant was closed for two weeks before the main production process were 
recommenced. The HSA issued a prohibition notice on the process involved and set out 
conditions to ensure the integrity of plant aspects before commencement of operations was 
allowed. 
3.3.2 TRANSPORT ACCIDENTS 
The only major accident involving the transport of dangerous substances in Ireland has been 
the explosion and fire on a ship and offshore jetty at Whiddy Island, Cork in 1979. Even 
though this has occurred outside the time scale of ten years defined for the study, and 
predates Directive 82/501/EEC (Seveso) it has been agreed to include it, due to the 
representative nature of the accident. It is the largest accident involving dangerous substances 
in Ireland in which the emergency services were extensively involved and therefore may 
provide valuable information concerning the lessons learnt on emergency planning. 
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The maJonty of transport accidents/incidents involving dangerous substances are minor. 
According to the HSA, on average six noteworthy accidents occur per year. In determining 
the transport accidents for this study we have chosen those accidents involving dangerous 
substances requiring the appropriate emergency services to be notified. Transport accidents 
which were mainly traffic accidents have not been included except where a significant 
leakage of dangerous substances has occurred, damage has been directly related to the 
dangerous substances being transported or a relevant lesson on emergency planning may be 
learnt. 
i Explosion and Fire on an oil tanker and jetty at Whiddy Island, Bantry, Cork 
08 January 1979 
A large oil tanker containing Arabian light crude, was moored at an off-shore jetty 
approximately 1,300 feet off Whiddy Island. Early in the morning of 08 January 1979, a 
disastrous fire occurred which enveloped a large section of the ship and offshore jetty. A 
number of explosions accompanied the fire, one of which was massive and severely damaged 
the oil tanker and jetty area. 
On alert of the disaster, emergency plans were put into operation. The Major Accident Plan 
was initiated by the Garda Siochana in the Bantry area. Local fire services from Bantry, 
Skibbereen and Dunmanway plus several helicopters, launches, tug and line boats were used 
during the emergency operation. Garda Siochana were stationed at Bantry pier to prevent 
interference with rescue services. A traffic system, morgue facilities and an incident and 
information centre were established. The Marine Rescue Co-ordination Centre at Shannon 
was contacted, but when the Garda Siochana were informed that the available helicopters 
could not operate at night the assistance of the Royal Navy helicopters was requested. An 
airfield near the town of Bantry lit by Electricity Supply Board vans and cars to enable the 
helicopters to land. Radio and telephone communications between the morgue, the Garda 
station and Whiddy Island were established. The Garda Siochana organised the search for the 
bodies of the victims. 
There were fifty fatalities including all those aboard the tanker and the crew on the offshore 
jetty. The vessel was rendered a total wreck and extensive damage was caused to the off-
shore jetty and its installations. 
The Major Accident Plan for the Cork area was in place prior to the accident. This accident 
predates the requirements of the "Seveso Regulations". Inquiries into this accident were 
carried out by the Irish Department of Tourism and Transport and the Department of Labour. 
A public enquiry in the form of a Tribunal was also conducted and a report issued. 
ii Petrol leakage and fire in Tuam, 1985 
An articulated road tanker carrying petrol skidded on ice and jack-knifed. The tank 
overturned, petrol spilled from the compartment and caught fire immediately. The driver 
pulled out through the broken windscreen by a second driver who came on the scene. The 
second driver saved him by wrapping his overalls around him. 
The tanker was completely destroyed. Windows and a door in a nearby house were damaged 
in the fire and a number of items were destroyed. The driver of the tanker received severe 
bums. The road was blocked for a considerable period of time. 
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iii Diesel oil spillage in Robertstown, 1985 
An articulated tank vehicle was carrying 4,600 litres of diesel oil. While negotlatmg a 
humped back bridge over a canal, the lead in to the fifth wheel dropped too sharply and 
caught the outlet pipe from number one compartment fracturing it and dislocated the internal 
foot valve pushing it up into the tank. As a result, the full load of diesel oil leaked into the 
canal. The Emergency Services were called to clean up the incident. 
The HSA cite this accident as an example of the importance of selecting routes which are 
suitable for transport. 
iv Hexane, Gormanstown Co. Meath, 04 May 1985, 
As the result of a collision with a car, at approximately 3:00 hours at Gormanstown, a tanker 
overturned carrying 5,000 gallons of hexane. The hexane, was imported from Holland 
through Greenore to its destination in Portlaiose. No leakage of hexane occurred. 
Two people were killed and one critically injured as the result of the road accident - not the 
hexane. 
As the tanker did not have the required hazardous substance markings, only an IMDG 
marking, the emergency services felt alot of time was wasted before the substance was 
identified. A number of houses and a petrol station nearby were evacuated as a precaution. 
The fire brigade sprayed the road and tanker with foam. The main Dublin-Belfast road was 
sealed off for half a mile for 12 hours so that the tanker container could be moved after being 
partly off loaded by a suitable portable pump into another road tanker brought to the scene. 
v Hydrofluoric acid spill at Paulstown, Kilkenny, 24 November 1986 
The containment structure holding the drums gave way and a 45 gallon drum of hydrofluoric 
acid fell from an articulated lorry carrying a full trailer load of these drums. The incident 
occurred at the junction of the N9 and N 10 National Primary Routes. The barrel had upturned 
and was leaking slowly. 
The Mhuine Bheag Fire Brigade, Carlow Fire Service were first in attendance at the scene 
who notified the Kilkenny Fire Service. In total a fire appliance from Mhuire Bheag Fire 
Brigade, an emergency tender from Carlow Fire Station, an emergency tender and a light 4 
wheel drive pumper appliance from Kilkenny Fire Station attended the scene. The Garda 
Siochana were also in attendance. 
The driver of the vehicle had noticed the barrel falling, knew the dangers of the substance and 
prevented anyone approaching the leaking barrels. The driver had the appropriate Tremcard 
and the vehicle had the correct hazardous substances warning placards. 
The firemen isolated the area around the spill. Traffic on the N 9 was prevented from passing 
the spill; it was directed on to the NlO and then back to the N9 by a minor road. The Garda 
Siochana controlled the traffic. 
The immediate problem was to prevent the spill spreading; this was accomplished by using 
turf mould (from a local supplier) to absorb the spilled acid. The firemen at the scene had to 
wear Breathing Apparatus (BA) and Gas Tight Chemical Protection Suits. 
It was considered advisable to evacuate the nearby houses but residents would not leave, even 
though approached by both the Fire Service and the Garda Siochana. They were therefore 
advised to remain indoors and keep windows and doors closed. 
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The driver notified the company whose chemicals were being shipped. As the company was 
part of a scheme which provides mutual assistance and advice during such incidents, a 
chemist was sent to the scene. 
In consultation with the chemist it was decided to move the drum to an isolated quarry, allow 
the acid to leak out onto a bed of lime which would neutralise the acid and then bury the lime, 
neutralised acid, barrel etc. The barrel was therefore put into a plastic tank, lifted onto a truck 
using machinery, driven to the quarry, off-loaded using machinery and allowed to leak onto a 
bed of lime. The lime, plastic tank, truck and machinery were provided by Kilkenny County 
Council. Again the main problem was that all personnel at the spill area and handling the 
barrel had to wear BA sets and Gas Tight Chemical Protection Suits. During transportation to 
the quarry a Garda vehicle preceded the truck to warn people to stay indoors. The truck was 
accompanied by the Emergency Tender and a Water Carrier from Kilkenny Fire Services 
which had been brought to the scene of the incident. 
Back at Paulstown the turf mould which had been used to absorb the spilled acid was 
gathered up in plastic bags and brought to the quarry where it was mixed with lime to 
neutralise the acid. Lime was spread on the road at the scene of the spill and then the road 
was washed with copious amounts of water. 
When the barrel had emptied itself onto the lime it was flushed with water and then lime, turf 
mould and barrel were buried using a County Council machine. The incident was finally 
closed at approximately 19.45 hours. 
At the quarry, local residents who had gathered to see what was happening were briefed by 
the Fire Service personnel and the chemist as to what was happening and were reassured that, 
once neutralised by the lime, the acid would be harmless. 
vi Phthalic Anhydride main Cork- Dublin Road 1zear Glanmire village, 6 February 1987 
Several packages of phthalic anhydride, packed in 25kg bags, fell off a flatbed trailer while 
it was travelling around a narrow bend on the Dublin - Cork road near Glanmire. Several 
bags of the powder substance burst. 
The driver of the trailer had the appropriate documentation on the nature of the load and the 
precautions to be taken in the event of a spillage. 
The police and fire services coordinated the emergency response. The event is alleged to have 
occurred at 15:00 hours. Cork City Fire Services were the first on the scene. They then 
contacted the Midleton Fire Services to accompany them. No action was taken until the 
appropriate procedures were determined using the chemdata system at the Fire Brigade 
Control Centre. A chemist from the manufacturer was also on the scene to provide expertise. 
The Fire services, in appropriate protective clothing (chemical suits and BA), spent five hours 
clearing the spillage. Fire officers said that a load of this nature should have been transported 
in a closed truck so as to contain the substance if leakage occurred - not an open trailer. 
Once the trailer was reloaded and on route to its destination once again, some more bags of 
the substance fell off. Two bags, one burst, were found at Penrose Quay (along the trailers 
route) subsequent to the initial spillage by the police. They were transported to the destination 
plant of the trailer by the police using the appropriate protective measures. The police 
retraced the trucks route through Cork City to determine if any more of the substance had 
spilled. 
There was no long term resulting damage. 
The carrier was prosecuted by the HSA and fined for failure to secure the load. 
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vii Sodium Hydroxide, Slane, 28 Apri/1988 
A load of pearl caustic soda(sodium hydroxide gold) in 25 kg palletised and shrink 
wrapped bags (600 +bags) was transported from the UK via Northern Ireland to Cork on a 
flatbed trailer. Eight bags of the pearl caustic fell off the flat bed and burst on the road. The 
driver did not stop. Eight bags were lost, however, only six were recovered. 
Children from a nearby school handled the pearl caustic. As a result, three children received 
severe burns. 
The Fire Brigade and Garda Siochana were in attendance at the scene of the incident. They 
cordoned off the area, recovered and re-bagged the caustic soda. The Fire Brigade used BA 
and protective clothing. 
The bags were appropriately labelled which identified the substance and the manufacturer. 
The Hazchem system was used to determine the appropriate actions to be taken. 
At the time of the incident the local radio station was used to inform the local population that 
the caustic soda had fallen from a passing vehicle and that it would cause severe damage to 
the eyes and skin. 
The accident was subsequently reported to the Department of Labour. 
The carrier was traced and subsequently prosecuted by the HSA and fined. 
viii Petrol explosion and fire, Donegal, 29103/88 
A portable pump was being used to pump petrol from an underground storage tank to a 
tanker. This activity was taking place inside a shed. The operating switch of the pump was 
placed on top of the tanker. While splash filling (which is prohibited) was in progress an 
explosion and fire occurred. 
On investigation, it was determined that the operating switch was not suitable for use in an 
explosive atmosphere. 
Two men were injured and the shed was burned down. 
A prosecution was made for not having a licence to store petrol and for not adhering to the 
proper safety precautions for petrol. 
ix Spillage of Silage Additive containing formic acid, Dennehy's Cross, Cork, 19105/88 
A silage additive containing formic acid was being transported in drums. A strap holding the 
drums on the carrier vehicle came loose and a drum fell off onto the roadway at Dennehy's 
Cross in Cork. The drum fractured and 100 kg of the substance spilled onto the roadway. 
The emergency response was coordinated by the fire brigade, police and ambulance 
personnel. The area was sealed to traffic once the incident was notified to the emergency 
services and the roadway cleared by the fire brigade using suitable protective clothing and 
equipment. 
The transport company was prosecuted by the HSA and fined. 
x Leakage of creosote, outside Tipperary, 21110/88 
A JCB digger and a tank vehicle containing 4,500 gallons of creosote collided resulting in the 
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tanker overturning on the side of the road. As a result of the collision, one of the lids on the 
tanker was damaged and bent with the result that the entire contents of creosote leaked onto 
the road and adjoining fields. There were no warning hazard plates on the vehicle and the 
driver did not have any documentation of the procedures to follow in the event of an accident. 
On investigation it was determined that the rear bumper on the tanker did not have an 
adequate gap between it and the back of the tanker and the protecting pipes. Such a gap 
would be necessary to prevent the contents of the tank from spilling if involved in an 
accident. 
The Fire Services were at the scene for 7.5 hours. The tanker had to be lifted by crane back 
onto its wheels. 
The carrier was prosecuted for not having certification under the Dangerous Substances 
Regulations, for the vehicle failing to carry required display plates, failing to arrange for the 
safe disposal of creosote, failure to notify the Department of Labour (HSA) of the accident 
and for carrying creosote in a vehicle which did not comply with the requirements relating to 
the construction and operation of the vehicle. 
xi Tank container of acrylonitrile fell of a vehicle, December 1991, Mayo 
A tank containing 18,200 litres of, the highly flammable and toxic substance, acrylonitrile fell 
from a transport vehicle outside its destination. The tank had been transported by rail from 
Dublin to Ballina train station. It was being transported by road to its destination in Killala. 
The tank fell off the vehicle and overturned on its side. The tank frame was badly damaged 
by the fall, but the tank sustained only minor damage. None of the substance leaked. The 
accident is of interest as it should be highly unlikely for such a toxic substance to fall off its 
transport vehicle. The twist locks on the truck were found to be deficient - in that when 
lowered or dropped they appeared locked even though they were not. 
The destination company response unit was on the scene within three minutes even though 
there was no spillage. 
The transport company were prosecuted for not stowing and securing the tank properly and 
fined £1,000. 
xii Chromium trioxide leakage, Letrim, 1991 
A van carrying chromium trioxide and sulphuric acid skidded. A spillage of the 50kg 
chromium trioxide container occurred when the drum was flung from the van as a result of 
the impact with the roadside. The Local Authority environmental engineers removed an area 
of contaminated farm land where the leakage occurred and performed a full clean up. 
3.4 DATA COLLECTION FORM 
The format for the Data Collection Form has been developed and commented on by 
representatives from the Department of the Environment, HSA and Department of Health. A 
blank Data Collection Form is included at Appendix 9. A Data Collection Form has been 
completed for each accident and submitted to the EC. For confidentiality reasons, these forms 
have not been included in the published report. Only the summaries of the accidents are 
included in this report. 
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4. LESSONS LEARNT 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
None of the on-site/off-site emergency plans for installations subject to the "Seveso 
Regulations" in Ireland have ever been fully activated, therefore this cannot be analysed. 
However, on analysis of the accidents detailed in Section Ill, we have endeavoured to extract 
the relevant lessons learnt by the manufacturers, emergency services and those bodies 
responsible for policy and legislation effecting emergency planning and response. Each 
accident has been evaluated in this manner and the lessons learnt have been summarised 
under specific topics: 
- Emergency Policy 
- Emergency Pre-planning 
-Accident Response 
- Information dissemination to the public & media 
- Post accident actions. 
In addition, lessons learnt as a result of training and exercise programmes and specific 
recommendations made by the sources who provided information for this study have also 
been included in this section. Many of these recommendations are already part of the 
emergency planning situation in Ireland. They are highlighted for their importance and 
interest to emergency planners in other EC countries. For your information, it has been 
indicated where new schemes were introduced as a result of lessons learnt. We believe this is 
of relevance to the study. Finally, a section on new initiatives has been included to illustrate 
possible future developments in emergency planning and response in Ireland. 
4.2 EMERGENCY PLANNING POLICY AND ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Several opinions and recommendations have been expressed during the course of research for 
this report on the overall emergency planning policy . These have been summarised in the 
following sections: 
4.2.1 Organisation 
In terms of the installations subject to the Seveso Regulations, the Central and Local 
Competent Authorities are respectively responsible for the enforcement and implementation 
of the "Seveso Regulations" requirements. 
For MEPs, the responsibility is spread between several government departments and 
designated emergency services which have limited resources and other non emergency 
planning functions to perform. The main responsibility to implement and co-ordinate the 
MEP is at local level with guidance provided by the relevant central government departments. 
The Inter-Departmental Committee on Peacetime Emergency Planning meets annually and 
plays an advisory role. 
In addition to this organisational structure, some sources believe there is a requirement for a 
formal, single, independent organisation dedicated solely to emergency planning. The 
organisation would regulate and monitor the implementation of the MEP to ensure effective 
co-ordination and practical implementation on a national scale i.e. to ensure the 
42 
conceptualised theoretical emergency planning strategy developed "on paper" via the MEP is 
implemented in practice. In addition, this organisation could act as the main feedback 
mechanism to ensure all relevant information from accident investigation, exercises. seminars 
etc. is disseminated and understood by all relevant bodies. 
This organisation would be composed of representatives from the organisations currently 
involved in emergency planning such as the Departments of the Environment, Health, 
Enterprise and Employment, Department of Transport, Energy and Communications, the 
HSA, emergency services, industry etc .. , with the main focus being at local level. Such an 
organisation could liaise with or include members of the Co-ordinating Groups in order to 
monitor the Framework implementation at a local level. 
These formalised organisational structures focus the emergency planning responsibility and 
allocate specific manpower resources to these tasks. Such formalised mechanisms provide a 
continuous means of ensuring the Framework is as effective in practice as it is theoretically 
conceived. 
It should be noted that not all sources agree on this issue. Some sources believe the current 
organisational structure meets these requirements. As there is a difference of opinion on this 
issue further investigation is recommended. 
4.2.3 Legislation 
The fact that the Major Emergency Planning Framework is not implemented by legislation, 
except those installations subject to the "Seveso Regulations", is seen as having both positive 
and negative aspects. The lack of legislation is perceived to afford flexibility to the system 
which is a necessity. However, in order to suitably formalise the Framework some sources 
recommend the introduction of suitable minimal statutory instruments designed not to inhibit 
the flexibility of the current system. 
Several contact sources considered that some sites currently not subject to the "Seveso 
Regulations", but in their opinion just as dangerous, should be controlled similarly. Because 
of the limits on the quantities of dangerous substances specified in the Regulations, sites 
using quantities of dangerous substances below these limits are not subject to the provisions 
of the legislation. Therefore the legislative control over these installations is comparatively 
less stringent, particularly with respect to off-site emergency planning. In this respect, it is 
recommended that the legislative structure governing installations using quantities of 
dangerous substances below the limits specified in the Regulations, but which pose a 
significant hazard, should be reviewed. 
4.3 EMERGENCY PRE-PLANNING 
4.3.1 Plan Content 
The content and quality of emergency plans will determine to a large extent the efficiency 
and suitability of the response to an emergency. All relevant provisions must be considered 
comprehensively when designing the plan. Extensive consultation must occur between all 
relevant organisations to ensure integration and coordination of the emergency response. The 
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plan must be reviewed and tested via seminars, meetings and exercises respectively on a 
regular basis. 
The following specific aspects have been stressed by sources as essential components of the 
emergency planning system: 
4.3.1.1 Hazard Analysis 
The first step in hazard analysis is to identify all the significant major hazards in each 
functional area and the associated risks. Subsequently, a detailed analysis of the risks may be 
conducted. In performing the analysis the potential for specific accidents occurring must be 
evaluated in conjunction with the ability of the emergency services and the community to 
respond. Resources must be allocated based on the perceived potential and likely hazards 
identified. Scenarios may be developed to consider all the potential permutations for likely 
accidents and the corresponding required emergency response. 
4.3.1.2 Resource Analysis 
Emergency Planning should be considered in the context of the relationship between the 
perceived realistic hazards and the resources available to meet them. Based on the required 
emergency responses necessary to handle the risks identified in the hazard analysis, resources 
must be allocated accordingly. Resources may include people with specific skills, finance, 
specialist equipment, materials, suppliers, facilities etc . .in the functional area or at the nearest 
possible location. A resource analysis will determine these resources and how they should be 
allocated. It is impractical that every emergency service would be fully equipped to handle 
every conceivable type of incident. Therefore, consultation should occur between the 
emergency services, industry, suppliers etc.. to determine the location, amount and 
accessibility of the required resources. For these purposes it is desirable that, in general, 
equipment of various services be standardised as far as possible. Emergency Services have 
experienced difficulty in obtaining supplies outside of normal office hours, which highlights 
further how resource provisions must be determined in advance. 
4.3.1.2.1 Training 
Continuous Training, as necessary, in the use of specialist equipment, materials and 
procedures for dealing with incidents involving dangerous substances is an integral 
component of emergency planning. In particular training should be provided in specialised 
skills such as performing hazard assessments, or in specific roles i.e. Controller of 
Operations, member of a Co-ordinating group etc ... to ensure effective performance. 
Specifically, installations subject to the "Seveso Regulations" and the emergency services 
recommend co-ordinating training so that the emergency services are familiar with the 
procedures for dealing with emergencies at these specific locations. 
4.3.1.2.2 Funding 
In order to effectively implement an emergency planning strategy appropriate funding must 
be provided. It has been suggested that emergency planning funding for personnel, training, 
exercises, provisions e.g. equipment etc .. should be allocated in national and local budgets. A 
further suggestion is to consider the allocation of EC funding for emergency exercises as 
these pose a substantial expenditure. 
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4.3.1.3 Pre-Determined Arrangements (PDAs) 
Established PDAs for dealing with anticipated emergency scenarios save time during an 
activated emergency response. Inter-agency arrangements should be determined in advance 
and practised. 
PDAs should be established for all relevant population risk groups. Risks groups within the 
population and provisions for notifying and communicating with them in the event of an 
emergency should be identified in advance. Risk groups may include, for example, the 
handicapped, deaf and immobile sectors of the population who are not able to respond to 
conventional emergency warning systems. 
4.3.1.4 Exceptional Measures 
The procedures and authorisations necessary to enable the emergency services to take 
exceptional measures in an emergency situation should be clarified in the emergency plans. In 
particular, authorisation to incur exceptional expenditure or to requisition special equipment 
should be specified. 
4.3.1.5 Environmental Pollution 
Environmental degradation may result from spillages of dangerous substances entering the 
environment through various pathways; air, surface water, groundwater, soil etc ... This 
pollution may occur as the direct result of an accident (e.g. the spillages of chromium 
trioxide, petrol and creosote) or due to the clean up procedures e.g. run-off from 
contaminated water. While operationally, the emergency services and industry may be aware 
of this and are active in preventing environmental degradation as a result of an accident, 
formal provisions to prevent and minimise environmental pollution should be specified in 
emergency plans. Hazard analysis should include environmental impacts and corresponding 
scenarios for accidents and responses should be developed. Modelling tools which illustrate 
the potential pathways of pollutants into the environment, determine their resulting impacts 
and how to ameliorate their effects e.g. air dispersion modelling for toxic clouds, are 
recommended for this type of scenario development. This approach is currently used by 
industry and the competent authorities. In particular, information on modelling would be 
expected in the notifications required under the "Seveso Regulations". 
It is expected that specific guidance on the environmental aspects of emergency planning will 
be provided by the newly established Environmental Protection Agency in Ireland. 
4.3.1.6 Meteorological data 
Provisions for obtaining meteorological data on a continuous basis should be included in 
emergency plans. This information is crucial to determining the behaviour of toxic clouds etc. 
The notified sites under the "Seveso Regulations" have a continuous interface with the local 
Meteorological Services. However, the availability of current accurate data may be limited by 
the proximity of the installation to the Meteorological Service. A system of establishing 
automated meteorological stations at specific installations is recommended. The 
Meteorological service have an arrangement to provide consultation and early warning in the 
event of dangerous emissions originating in other countries which may effect Ireland. 
4. 3.1. 7 Co-ordination 
It has been stressed that co-ordination between the relevant emergency services, industry (in 
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particular sites subject to the "Seveso Regulations"), the HSA and other relevant agencies is 
essential in performing pre-emergency planning activities e.g. establishing PDAs etc ... 
Hazard and resource analysis performed by manufacturers are communicated to the relevant 
agencies for analysis in terms of their requirements and resources respectively, to ensure co-
ordination between the two. Inter-agency co-ordination is valuable in establishing a rapport 
between agencies and individuals likely to be involved in an emergency response. It can 
ensure speedy co- ordination in an emergency situation. 
Emergency planning provisions should concentrate on specifying organisational and inter-
organisational relationships as well as operational functions. The operational services are 
those normally practised by the emergency services, whereas the inter- organisational co-
ordination required for a major emergency is not normally practised and therefore warrants 
specific provisions. 
4.3.2 Industrial Fixed Installation Emergency Planning Provisions 
Industrial installations can be proactive in accident prevention measures by being aware of 
the hazards and associated risks and implementing systems to safeguard man and the 
environment from them. Firstly they need information on mechanisms to prevent accidents 
involving dangerous substances. They must be fully aware of emergency planning 
requirements such as those under the "Seveso Regulations". Meetings and seminars for 
industry, Local Competent Authorities, the Central Competent Authority and all other 
organisations relevant to emergency planning provide a continuous media for 
communications and discussion on accident prevention and other relevant emergency 
planning issues. 
Recommendations for accident prevention systems include hazard identification and analysis 
and the implementation of internal safety and environmental management systems e.g. those 
schemes implemented under the Responsible Care initiative. 
As part of this proactive approach, specific emergency planning provisions are developed as 
described in Section II. Liaison with the HSA, Local Competent Authorities etc ... to develop 
emergency planning provisions is essential. Training programmes and exercises for site 
personnel as well as the Emergency Services (in particular the Local Authority) are 
conducted by several sites. 
As indicated in the accidents analysed, unexpected chemical reactions can occur when normal 
circumstances are altered e.g. when a contaminant enters the system, or when a laboratory 
trial is conducted at pilot level. In addition, lack of formalised procedures to identify all 
reactions and information about a product under all possible conditions can have explosive 
consequences, as illustrated in the fixed installation accidents in Dublin and Shannon. These 
types of accidents may be prevented by performing stringent, comprehensive hazard analysis 
procedures and implementing the associated protective measures. However, the 
comprehensiveness of these procedures is generally dictated by financial, manpower and time 
constraints. Recommendations to prevent, as far as possible such accidents occurring include 
the implementation of formal, stringent procedures for new product introduction and for 
change control. In addition, internal audits are recommended to evaluate the technical, safety, 
environmental and emergency planning systems at installations. This is an area which we 
recommend requires further investigation. 
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Finally, it is felt that no matter how efficient the proactive measures to prevent accidents and 
the emergency response procedures, all those involved in an emergency must use common 
sense and "think on their feet" in an emergency situation. 
4.3.3 Transport Emergency Planning Procedures 
In addition to the provisions for the transport of dangerous substances detailed in Section 
2.4.4, the following recommendations are highlighted for the transport of dangerous 
substances. 
4.3.3.1 Integrity of containment structures 
Prior to transport, the suitability of the containment vessels, packaging and transport vehicle 
to the dangerous substances being conveyed must be determined to ensure the integrity of the 
substance during transport. Inadequate containment and vehicle design were causal factors in 
two of the accidents analysed in Section III. The phthalic anhydride should have been 
transported in a closed truck to contain the powdered substance if the packaging became 
damaged. Deficiencies in the containment structure on the vehicles for both the formic acid 
spillage and acrylonitrile incident resulted in the drums and tank container respectively, 
falling off the vehicle. 
4.3.3.2 Routing 
When determining the routes used for the transport of dangerous substances by road the 
following issues should be considered where possible: 
(a) The suitability of the route compared to the size and weight of the vehicle. The diesel 
spillage at Robertstown was the result of the tank trying to negotiate a humped back 
bridge, which was not a suitable route for this vehicle in the first place. 
(b) Densely populated areas should be avoided. 
(c) Areas with heavy traffic congestion at specific times should be avoided. 
The transport of dangerous substances by rail as described in Section 2.4.4.2, is well 
managed. The relevant emergency services are notified of the movements of dangerous 
substances by rail through their functional areas. The train is rescheduled in the event of large 
public gatherings in the vicinity of a rail route. The Garda Siochana strongly recommend the 
prior determination of the logistical arrangements for accessing every mile of rail track in the 
event of an emergency as described in Section 2.4.4.2. 
4.3.3.3 Transport by sea 
Under the IMDG Code, a Dangerous Goods Note is required for transport by sea. However, 
some carriers recommend the use of TREMCARDS on transports by sea in addition to the 
Dangerous Goods Note. For hazardous cargo, notices giving the UN number and the location 
of the substances on the ship should be placed on notice boards for the attention of the ships 
officer in the event of an emergency. The carrier should provide the local emergency services 
with a listing of the hazardous substances being carried on ships listing their UN numbers. 
4.3.3.4 Transporters and drivers 
Carriers recommend that the transport vehicles used are radio controlled, however, as 
interference in communications can result in inaccurate information being transmitted, 
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dedicated lines where possible are suggested. In addition, the drivers are trained in 
conjunction with the requirements of the European Communities (Vocational Training of 
Drivers of Vehicles Carrying Dangerous Goods) Regulations. Prior to carriage of dangerous 
goods, transporters should determine the safety standards adhered to by the prospective client. 
If required, the transporter recommends the discussion of all safety procedures with the client 
to prevent misunderstanding and ensure the client complies with the necessary requirements. 
4.3.3.5 Storage Areas 
As leakages etc ... may occur in storage areas prior to transport, transporters recommend that a 
control system be operated in this area. For example, one recommendation is that all gantry 
movements in storage areas are computer operated and videoed. When vehicles come into the 
storage area, the UN and EEC numbers of the substances carried are logged at the gatehouse 
on the computer and allocated a number. Once entered into the system these numbers give 
total information on the substances carried . Therefore, if an accident occurs in the storage 
area the computer can immediately determine what it contains and the implications. Other 
chemicals which could be hazardous in the event of an accident/leak of this substance can be 
located and removed quickly using this system. 
4.3.4 Evaluation of the emergency planning system 
Several mechanisms exist for evaluating emergency plans. The plans must be reviewed and 
updated on a regular basis. Exercises to practically test the plan should be organised and 
seminars/meetings should be conducted. Representatives from all relevant organisations e.g. 
emergency services, industry, government, HSA etc .. must be involved in these mechanisms 
to ensure effective evaluation. In the light of information from accidents/incidents at home 
and abroad, exercise debriefs, emergency planning policy initiatives etc ... the emergency 
plans should be evaluated and modified accordingly in an iterative process to ensure 
continuous improvement in the system. 
4.3.4.1 Exercises 
Exercises of some form (table top/full scale) should be conducted on a regular basis to test the 
effectiveness of the emergency plans and identify practical deficiencies in procedures or 
resources prior to an emergency. All relevant organisations should be represented at exercises 
either to participate or as observers to monitor the exercise. Full scale exercises will include 
representatives from all organisations. Generally a realistic scenario involving the co-
ordination of all the emergency services is conducted. Adequate advance preparation is 
recommended to determine the required objectives of the exercise and to develop a 
purposeful scenario and narrative. Video of the exercises has proved to be a useful learning 
tool. 
Exercises provide an opportunity for personnel to familiarise themselves practically with 
there roles and responsibilities and those of the other organisations involved. Formal 
procedures for debrief subsequent to the exercise should ensure a comprehensive review of 
the lessons learnt from the exercise and the circulation of this information to all relevant 
agencies via a report. 
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4.4 ACCIDENT RESPONSE 
4.4.1 Activation of Plan 
It has been learnt that the criteria for activation of the MEP must be clear or else confusion 
will arise as to whether a situation warrants its activation. The guidelines are that the MEP 
should be activated for "any event or threatened event" beyond the normal capability of the 
emergency services. It is not necessary to implement every detail of the plan. PDAs for 
dealing with the necessary aspects of the emergency will be implemented as required. The 
MEP must be flexible enough to be scaled down as required. 
4.4.2 Information at the scene of an accident 
As illustrated in the transport accidents involving hexane and creosote, precious response 
time is wasted at the scene of an emergency due to a lack of appropriate information or 
incorrect information concerning the dangerous substances involved. Therefore, it is essential 
to set up systems to quickly identify dangerous substances and determine the most effective 
action to be taken. In the transportation of dangerous substances the labelling and 
identification systems described in section 2.4.4, such as ADRIRID and Hazchem, are found 
to be effective if implemented appropriately. At some incidents, emergency services have 
found Tremcards from previous deliveries in the vehicle and the driver unable to indicate 
which Tremcard is current. 
Once identified the emergency services may determine the appropriate action to protect 
themselves and respond to the situation effectively by access to systems such as Chemdata. 
Provisions for contacting personnel with expertise of dangerous substances are essential. The 
caustic soda incident in Slane and the hydrofluoric acid spillage in Kilkenny illustrate how 
the correct information held on the transport vehicle and advice from expert sources 
respectively, greatly helps the response to a transport accident involving dangerous 
substances. 
It is recommended that databases of hazardous chemical substances include not only 
information on the dangerous substances but also the products of combustion and known 
reactions, as well as chemicals which should not be allowed to come into contact with it. 
At sites which are not staffed on a 24 hour basis it may not be possible to obtain accurate 
information on dangerous substances at the site. Therefore, at installations storing 
and/holding dangerous substances all storage containers of dangerous substances should be 
clearly labelled. Maps, sketches, aerial surveys of installations should also be available as part 
of emergency plans to focus discussions and plan actions in the event of an emergency. 
Information on the movement of dangerous substances by all modes of transport through each 
functional area should be held and accessible as required by the emergency services etc ... 
Currently this information is only available for dangerous substances transported by rail and 
sea. However, information is currently being obtained for installations subject to the "Seveso 
Regulations"in the Cork/Kerry functional area on all inputs and outputs of dangerous 
substances relevant to these sites via all modes of transport. 
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4.4.3 Co-ordination, Communication and Control 
As none of the on-site/off-site emergency plans for installations subject to the "Seveso 
Regulations" in Ireland have ever been fully activated, the resulting co-ordination, 
communication and control cannot be analysed. However, the Major Accident Plan has been 
activated in an accident involving dangerous substances i.e. the Whiddy Island disaster. As 
detailed in section 3.3.2, this 1979 accident predates the Seveso Regulations. The 
investigating tribunal concluded that the Major Accident Plan and the response by the 
emergency services involved was efficient, prompt and worked well. It was concluded that, 
irrespective of this, there was nothing that could have been done to save those who died in the 
accident. 
The Kilkenny transport incident involving hydrofluoric acid also illustrates effective co-
ordination between the Garda Siochana, Fire Services and specialist chemical advisers. 
Effective control and communications is essential to an effective emergency response. In 
order to ensure this, it is recommended that a system to control the emergency situation, the 
responding personnel and equipment must be established immediately at the scene of an 
incident. This will provide a focus for communications and co- operation. Experience from 
emergencies and exercises indicates that adequate communications can be a problem and 
without effective communications good co- ordination cannot be achieved. In order to 
establish control and communication it is recommended that the Control and Holding Areas 
and location of the Co-ordinating Group are established as soon as possible in the event of a 
major emergency. This will facilitate the following: 
1. Communications and co-ordination between the various Controllers of Operations and 
senior personnel. Each must communicate with their counterparts in the other 
responding agencies to avoid duplication and ensure maximum efficiency of response. 
2. Collection of information on the emergency. Specifically it has been found that a 
communication breakdown occurs between those at the scene of the incident and 
Controllers of Operation and the Co-ordinating Group. Provisions are recommended to 
designate specific personnel to collect information and report back to the Controllers 
and the Co-ordinating Group. 
3. Identification of where to seek assistance and guidance for both the response personnel 
and public. 
4. The prioritisation of actions. 
5. Facilitate the deployment of resources at the site. 
The issue of who/whom has overall control in a major emergency can be sensitive and has 
many implications. As described in Section 2.6.1, the overall control via the Co-ordinating 
Group is a function of multiple co-ordination between the designated emergency services, 
except for when a Danger Area is established, in which the senior fire brigade has overall 
control. Due to the nature of chemical emergencies and the rapidity at which decisions are 
required several sources recommend that one designated key individual should have overall 
control of the emergency response. However, other sources feel that the multiple control is 
beneficial in that there is a backup decision making process. As there appears to be a 
difference of opinion on this issue, further investigation is recommended in this area. 
At fixed installations, specific agreements should be determined to clarify who has overall 
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control - the emergency services or the manufacturer. As a result of the conflict between the 
internal and external emergency services at the accident in the fertiliser plant in Cork, it was 
agreed that the manufacturer has overall control in terms of the actions taken for emergencies 
at the manufacturer's installation. Improved communications and co-ordination via 
consultation and training schemes between the emergency services and the manufacturer has 
ameliorated such conflicts. 
For additional services called in to assist the emergency services (e.g. Civil Defence, Army) 
overall control is exercised by the Controller of Operations responsible for their call out. 
Finally, in order to practically facilitate co-ordination and communications it is recommended 
that personnel responding to the emergencies are easily identified. Emergency services 
personnel, experts etc... arriving at the scene of an accident in civilian clothing without 
suitable identification detailing their expertise, results in confusion and delays. Therefore all 
non-uniformed responding personnel are issued with PVC jerkins colour coded in relation to 
their job/function with a 2" reflective tape at the bottom of the jerkin. 
4.4.4 Evacuation 
The unusual scenario of a gas cloud moving towards the evacuation meeting point is 
illustrated by the accident at the chemical manufacturers in Shannon. This highlights the 
necessity for alternative evacuation and assembly provisions and/or gas protective measures 
to be set up in the event of contamination of the site, danger from emitted gases etc. 
4.5 INFORMATION DISSEMINATION TO THE PUBLIC AND MEDIA 
The provision of suitable information to the public concerning installations subject to the 
specific requirements of the Seveso Regulations" is a proactive emergency planning measure. 
The specific content of this information is detailed in section 2.4.1.2. Some of the specific 
recommended methods used by industry to meet these requirements are detailed below. 
Several installations operate communications programmes consisting of information packages 
sent out to target audiences and inviting then to visit the site. Initially, some manufacturers 
were cautious about disseminating safety information to the public. However, they have 
learnt that the more information they provide, the better the response from the residents. It is 
believed that using the local newspaper as a medium to disseminate this information does not 
target the total audience. Therefore leaflets are sent to all residences and installations in the 
vicinity of an installation detailing the action to be taken in the event of an emergency. 
These actions include the following information: 
- protective measures such as closing windows and doors, 
- the local radio station to tune to for information, 
- residents are asked to avoid using the telephone to avoid 
overloading the system, 
- instruction to wait indoors until the Garda Siochana give the all clear. 
In particular, some installations have installed alarm systems to alert residents to possible 
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leakages of dangerous substances. Information on the procedures to take on hearing these 
alarms and dates and times of alarm tests is contained in the leaflets sent to residents. 
Information sheets on the dangerous substances used are distributed by many installations. 
Information leaflets are also provided to visitors and contractors at an installation containing 
data on fire, safety, evacuation and security procedures. 
Several installations operate a programme whereby the public may visit the site at a specified 
time and speak to personnel on safety issues. Specific audiences such as local residents, 
schools, local politicians, teachers, clergy, environmental groups etc... are targeted by 
installations in their information programmes. 
For installations which are located in an industrial area it is recommended that plans are 
established, where relevant, for a combined help system with neighboring installations in the 
event of any emergency. 
In the Major Emergency Planning it is strongly recommended that provisions are included to 
establish communications to the public and media in the event of an emergency. As described 
in section 2.6.3, these arrangements are for establishing communications media as well as 
disseminating information. Manufactures also make provisions in their plans for handling 
enquiries etc. from the press and media. Manufacturers recommend that a company 
representative is allocated to keep the press and public informed on the status of the incident, 
any threats to health, the environment etc ... during and subsequent to the accident. 
Following accidents and before recommencement of operations, many manufacturers have 
communicated to the public via newspaper etc... the results of the investigation of the 
accident, recommendations made and their implementation, plus measures to ensure such 
accidents do not happen again. Also local residents and other interested bodies are invited to 
visit the site, as described above, to allay their fears. 
As there is a conflict of interest between the aims of the media and the responding emergency 
services in the event of an emergency, it is recommended that an understanding is agreed with 
media sources as part of the emergency pre-planning activities. Suitable arrangements in this 
area are currently being developed in Ireland. 
4.6 POST ACCIDENT 
4.6.1 Investigation and feedback 
Following an emergency involving dangerous substances mechanisms for investigation, 
reporting, feedback and follow up must be instigated to ensure that lessons learnt are 
documented and circulated to all relevant personnel. This information may then be used to 
ensure similar events do not occur in future. 
Following the investigation/reporting of accidents, a formal mechanism should be established 
to feedback relevant information to all relevant organisations in industry, emergency services, 
government, enforcement etc. within the constraints of the manufacturers confidentiality 
requirements. All organisations involved in emergency planning should receive this 
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information so that it maybe used for future emergency planning. As described in Section 
2.5.4, FICI is currently developing a system of disseminating information on accidents at 
Federation member sites to Federation members for these purposes. 
Companies with several sites within the same country or abroad operate formal hazard 
communications programmes whereby lessons learnt following accidents, exercises etc .. are 
communicated to each site with a view to improving safety, systems and emergency planning. 
Forums such as seminars, meetings etc .. involving representatives from industry, Local 
Competent Authorities, Company Authorities etc provide an ideal opportunity for discussion 
of feedback from accidents and how the information may be used to improve the emergency 
planning and accident response system. 
As no "major accidents" have occurred in Ireland which warrant activation of the "Seveso 
Regulations" on-site and off-site emergency plans, it is important to analyse all relevant 
accidents which occur and develop the potential likely scenario further to identify all short 
and long-term implications so that provisions may be established. The Health Board 
particularly stresses the need to consider all relevant medical and psychological impacts of 
"major accidents" and whether facilities are available to meet the potential requirements. 
4.6.2 Confidentiality 
In all communications and feedback mechanisms, confidentiality of information must be 
handled appropriately. A balance must be achieved between the commercial confidentiality 
requirements of the manufacturer and the need to make all relevant information available to 
the bodies involved in Emergency Planning. Some sources feel that the freedom of access to 
information is limited in this area and this hinders essential communications mechanisms. 
These sources believe that confidentiality restrictions are such that relevant and necessary 
information flow between industry, the Central Competent Authority and the Local 
Competent Authorities is obstructed for the purposes of emergency planning review. The 
result is that sufficient feedback from accidents relevant to organisations for emergency 
planning purposes is not always obtainable. The Competent Authority do not agree with this 
opinion. Therefore, there is a requirement for developing provisions detailing the scope of 
feedback information to be disseminated to the Local Competent Authorities subsequent to an 
investigation. 
4. 7 NEW INITIATIVES 
Computer Aided Management of Emergency Operations 
Several computer based emergency planning tools to facilitate emergency planning and 
response in Ireland are currently being evaluated. One example of these is the CAMEO 
APELL system which is currently being considered by the Southern Health Board. The 
CAMEO (Computer- Aided Management of Emergency Operations) APELL (Awareness 
and Preparedness for Emergency at Local Level) programme is designed to provide regional 
governments with a tool to manage information about hazardous substances in or near their 
communities and to help emergency teams plan for the safe handling of chemical accidents. It 
was developed by the Chemical Emergency Procedures and Prevention Office of the US 
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in co-ordination with the Hazardous Materials 
Response Branch of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and 
the Industry and Environment Office of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). 
Such systems organise information on hazardous materials so that it may be used for 
developing emergency plans. The user may record and store information on topics such as the 
following: 
- Facilities storing/using hazardous chemicals 
- Transportation of hazardous chemicals 
- Contacts associated with emergency planning and response 
- Resources for emergency response i.e. suppliers of equipment, medical resources etc .. 
- Specific populations in the area and their locations including specific risk gaps 
requiring special attention 
- Evacuation information 
- Shipping firms transporting hazardous materials in specified areas 
- Citizens requests for information. 
The system should hold information on all commonly transported hazardous chemicals. The 
data requirements include chemicals names, synonyms, trade names, identification numbers 
and labelling conventions. For each chemical there must be easy and quick access to 
information describing the chemicals properties, hazards and how to deal with them in an 
emergency. 
For each facility all necessary emergency planning information should be stored. In addition, 
scenarios should be created and stored for incidents and releases at specific facilities. Site 
plans should be discussed to indicate such things as the storage of hazardous materials. In 
terms of transport, data on when, where and how dangerous substances are transported in an 
area by road, rail, pipelines and waterways should be assembled. 
It is recommended that the EC consider the development of a system for computer aided 
management of emergency planning which conforms to the requirements of the EC 
emergency planning legislation. It is possible that an existing system such as CAMEO 
APPELL may be modified to suit EC requirements. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The scope of this study has encompassed the following: 
- a comprehensive review of the emergency planning structure in Ireland, 
- an analysis of specific accidents to highlight specific positive and negative issues which 
may be useful to emergency planners and industry, 
- recommendations and lessons learnt have also been included where relevant. 
The strategy for emergency planning and response accidents involving dangerous substances 
in Ireland is based on the MEP Framework. As described in Section II, the theory behind the 
Major Emergency Planning Framework involves the preparation of a MEP based on local 
hazard and resource assessments, evaluation and testing of the plan via exercises and updating 
of the plan, as required, in an iterative process. Mandatory emergency planning provisions 
specified under the Seveso Regulations" are developed and cross referenced to the MEP. All 
the plans shoul be co-ordinated and integrated throughout all stages of design and 
modification. 
The main lessons learnt throughout the entire emergency planning and response lifecycle 
have been summarised in terms of: 
-policy, 
-emergency pre-planning, 
- accident response, 
- information dissemination to the public and media, 
- post accident. 
5.2 POLICY 
The concept of the Major Emergency Planning framework is seen to be efficient. However it 
is recommended that certain aspects be formalised where suitable, without inhibiting the 
essential flexibility of the system. One aspect of this is the formalisation of emergency 
services planning organisation structures solely devoted to emergency planning. In particular 
some sources believe there is a requirement for a single independent body to guide and 
monitor the Major Emergency Planning Framework to ensure that the theoretical Framework, 
of inter-organisational co-ordination of emergency planning and response, is effective in 
practice. 
5.3 EMERGENCY PRE-PLANNING 
The design of emergency procedures must be such that the content and quality ensure an 
effective, suitable and rapid emergency response. All emergency planning provisions must be 
comprehensive, clear and rehearsed. The importance of consultation with all relevant 
organisations at all pre-planning stages is stressed to ensure an integrated, co-ordinated 
response. 
Specific essential components of emergency planning and associated recommendations are 
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highlighted in Section IV for all organisations involved in emergency planning, for both fixed 
installations and the transport of dangerous substances. 
5.4 ACCIDENT RESPONSE 
The information at the scene of an accident must be as comprehensive as possible to enable 
the senior officers to make the most suitable and rapid decisions concerning emergency 
response. The emergency response provisions must facilitate a rapid, effective 
implementation of the emergency operations. 
Computer aided management tools, facilitate emergency planning preparation as well as 
managing the information at the scene of an emergency. Such tools greatly aid the 
determination of emergency response strategies. The integration of suitable computer aided 
management tools to facilitate all stages of emergency planning and response is currently 
being investigated in Ireland and is strongly recommended. 
Overall communications, coordination and control play a major role at each stage of the 
emergency planning and response life cycle. In particular, effective control and 
communications structures must be quickly established in an emergency situation in order to 
ensure a co-ordinated, efficient and rapid response. 
5.5 INFORMATION DISSEMINATION TO THE PUBLIC AND MEDIA 
Programmes for information dissemination must exist prior, during and subsequent to 
emergencies situations. This is an area which should not be underestimated. Provisions must 
be arranged for managing the media and public as well as keeping them informed. Section 4.5 
highlights recommendations, for the content of communication programmes, the mechanisms 
of dissemination and target audiences. 
5.6 POST ACCIDENT 
Appropriate analysis, investigation, reporting, feedback and follow-up are essential post 
accident activities. All lessons learnt should be documented and circulated to all agencies 
involved in the emergency planning process. Formal mechanisms should be developed to 
ensure this feedback occurs within as wide a scope as necessary. These lessons should be used 
where relevant to improve the emergency planning and response system to prevent similar 
accidents occurring in the future. 
Commercial confidentiality requirements may hinder communications mechanisms such as 
post accident feedback. It is recommended that commercial confidentiality requirements are 
clearly defined such that the necessary flow of information relevant to organisations involved 
in emergency planning is understood and is not in any way obstructed. 
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APPENDIX 

APPENDIX 1 GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
ADR 
BA 
BPM 
CEFIC 
DCF 
EC 
FIC 
HSA 
lATA 
ICAO 
IMDG 
IMES 
MEP 
MPRT 
PDAs 
Tremcard 
European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous 
Goods by Road 
Breathing Apparatus 
Best Practicable Means 
European Council of Chemical Manufacturers Federation 
Data Collection Form 
European Community 
Federation of Irish Chemical Industries 
Health and Safety Authority 
International Air Transport Authority 
International Civil Aviation Organisation 
International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code 
Irish Marine Emergency Service 
Major Emergency Plan 
Marine Pollution Response Team 
Pre-Determined Arrangements 
Transport Emergency Card 
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APPENDIX 3 INFORMATION SOURCES 
List of-Information Sources for the Study 
Health and Safety Authority (HSA) 
Dr. P.J. Claffey 
Mr. Micheal Flynn 
Mr. J.P. Goulding 
Mr. Tom O'Donnell 
Mr. Pat O'Halloran 
Mr. Micheal O'Hart 
Department of the Environment 
Mr. Frank Donohue 
Ms. Eileen Hughes 
Mr. Brian Murnane 
Department of Health 
Mr. Frank Ahem 
Mr. Larry O'Reilly 
Regional Health Boards 
Mr. Sean Hurley 
Mr. Patrick O'Riordan 
Capt. Brian Phelan 
Local Authorities 
Fire Services 
Mr. Hugh Corrigan 
Mr. Liam Curran 
Mr. P. Forkan 
Mr. M. Hessin 
Mr. Liam V. Malone 
Mr. Dennis O'Mahony 
Mr. Gerr Malone 
Environmental Engineers 
Cork County Council 
Leitrim County Council 
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Process Industries Unit, Dublin 
HSA, Cork 
Process Industries Unit, Cork 
HSA,Cork 
Dangerous Substances Group, Dublin 
HSA, Sligo 
Fire and Emergency Services 
Fire and Emergency Services 
Assistant Principal Officer Fire and Emergency Services 
Principal Officer Department of Health 
Hospital Services Division 
Chief Executive Officer Southern Health Board 
Technical Services Mid-Western Health Board 
Chief Ambulance Officer Southern Health Board 
Chief Fire Officer Kilkenny Fire Services 
Chief Fire Officer Donegal Fire Brigade 
Chief Fire Officer Lei trim County Council 
Assistant Chief Fire Officer Cork County Council 
Drogheda Fire Officer Drogheda Corporation Fire Brigade 
Chief Fire Officer Cork Corporation Fire Brigade 
Chief Fire Officer Cork County Council Fire Brigade 
Garda Siochana 
Superintendant J. Canning 
Chief Superintendant B. Garvey 
Sergeant John Gillan 
Superintendant D. J. O'Sullivan 
Branch Services, Traffic Section Garda Siochana 
Garda Siochana Commissioners Office Garda Headquarters 
Branch Services, Traffic Section Garda Siochana 
D Branch Services, Traffic Section Garda Siochana 
Department of Transport, Energy and Communications 
Mr. J. V. Feehan 
Mr. Tom Tobin 
Mr. Patrick White 
Department of the Marine 
Capt. Livingston 
Harbour Authorities 
Relevant Manufacturers 
Other Organisations 
Dr. Clive Cathcart 
Poisons Information Centre 
Mr. Paddy Dunn 
Dick Tracey 
Railway Inspecting Officer 
Road Transport 
Aeronautical Operational Services 
Irish Marine Emergency Services 
Director, Chemical Industries Group Federation of Irish 
Chemical Industries 
Beaumont Hospital 
Safety Officer JET OIL 
Safety Officer Bell Lines (transportation company) 
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APPENDIX 4 GENERIC OUTLINE OF INFORMATION ON 
EMERGENCIES REQUESTED 
Generic Outline of the Information on Emergencies Requested 
The generic outline below represents the scope of information researched for the study. This 
generic outline was customised to suit the specific responsibilities of the respective 
organisations/individuals from whom information was requested. For example, the company 
involved in a "major accident" was asked for information on the on-site emergency plans and 
information provided to the public whereas the Local Authority was asked for information on 
the off-site emergency plans prepared. All restrictions due to confidentiality have been 
respected while obtaining this data. 
Fixed Installation Accidents 
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A. Organisational structure and responsibilities of the organisations responsible for 
emergency planning and accidents involving dangerous substances.(e.g. Dept. of 
Environment, Dept. of Health, Dept. of Justice, Local Authorities, HSA, industry, etc ... ) 
B. Pre-Emergency Planning for industrial activities falling under either the 
general/specific emergency planning responsibilities of the Irish legislation 
implementing Directive 82/50 1/EEC. 
1. provisions of a specific emergency plan format/model used 
2. provisions of an emergency plan prepared (e.g. on-site and off-site plan) for the 
industrial site 
3. details of any safety information made available to the public (where relevant) 
C. Relevant incident/accident descriptions 
1. general description of any relevant incidents/accidents 
2. dangerous substances involved 
3. extent of damage/loss 
4. when and how emergency measures were taken on and off-site 
5. list of emergency services involved and the major actions they performed 
D. Information dissemination to the public during the incident/accident (where relevant) 
1. details of information provided and when 
2. method of communication used 
3. management of the press and media 
E. Post Accident Actions taken 
1. details of post accident actions performed 
2. details of the actions taken by the Emergency Services 
F. Lessons learnt/Evaluation of the emergency planning during and after accident 
1. pre-planning: details of the suitability and efficiency of any emergency plans 
(on/off-site) during and after the incident. Comment on any changes that you would 
make to future plans or the pre- planning procedure 
2. comment on the suitability and accessibility of emergency planning information 
available at the scene of the incident such that the most appropriate emergency 
response may be implemented as quickly as possible. 
3. during/post incident/accident 
a. comments on the success/efficiency of the emergency measures implemented on-
site and/or off-site 
b. comments on the coordination between the emergency services, expert resources, 
others resources and the company involved 
c. comment on the efficiency of the role of the emergency services 
4. information provided to the public and media (where relevant) 
a. comments on the suitability of the information during the incident 
b. comments on the efficiency of the method of dissemination 
5. comments on the suitability/efficiency of the emergency planning requirements 
under the current legislation implementing the Seveso Directive. Comment on any 
changes you feel would improve emergency planning. 
6. comments on any other post-accident conclusions regarding emergency planning. 
Highlight any positive or negative aspects not already covered above. 
Transport Accidents 
A. Organisational structure and responsibilities of the organisations responsible for 
emergency planning and accidents involving the transport of dangerous substances 
(Dept. of Transport, HSA, Dept. of Marine, Irish Road Haulage Association, Industry 
(Bell Lines) etc ... ) 
B. Pre-Emergency Planning for the transport of dangerous substances: 
1. provisions of a specific emergency plan format for: 
a. packaging design 
b. labelling 
c. identification of contents and potential risks 
d. actions to be taken in emergencies e.g. data on Tremcards 
e. driver training 
f. protection against collision damage 
g. protection and safety equipment 
h. routing 
i. compatability with other chemicals 
j. spacing requirements during transport 
2. details of any further emergency planning provisions specific to road, rail, sea or air 
transport respectively 
3. details of pre-emergency exercises or practices for transport accidents 
4. provisions for terrorist actions involving the transport of dangerous substances 
5. details of any safety information made available to the public (where relevant) 
C. Relevant incident/accident descriptions for transport accidents involving dangerous 
substances 
1. general description of any relevant incidents/accidents 
2. dangerous substances involved 
3. extent of damage/loss 
4. when and how emergency measures were taken on and off-site 
5. list of the Emergency Services involved and details on the major actions taken by 
them in the transport accidents involving dangerous substances to be analysed for 
this study. 
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D. Information dissemination to public during the incident/accident (where relevant) 
1. details of information provided and when 
2. method of communication used 
3. management of the press and media 
E. Post Accident Actions taken 
1. details of post accident actions performed 
2. emergency services involved and the actions taken 
F. Lessons learnt/Evaluation of the emergency planning during and after the transport 
accident/incident 
1. pre-planning: details of the suitability and efficiency of any emergency plans during 
and after the incident e.g. comment on whether the information provided at the 
accident scene (on Tremcards, HAZCHEM etc ... ) is, in practice, most suitable for a 
quick and efficient initiation of the appropriate emergency response. Comment on 
any changes that you would make to future plans or the pre-planning procedure 
2. during/post incident/accident 
a. comments on the success/efficiency of the emergency measures implemented on 
site and/or off-site 
b. comments on the coordination between the emergency services, expert resources, 
other resources and the company involved 
c. comment on the efficiency of the role of the emergency services 
3. information provided to the public and media (where relevant) 
a. comments on the suitability of the information during the incident 
b. comments on the efficiency of the method of dissemination 
4. comments on the suitability/efficiency of the emergency planning requirements 
under the current legislation e.g. the Dangerous Substances Act and Regulations and 
the EC (Dangerous Substances) Classification, Packaging and Labelling) 
Regulations. Comment on any changes you feel would improve emergency planning. 
5. comments on any other post-accident conclusions regarding transport emergency 
planning. Highlight any positive or negative aspects not already covered above. 
APPENDIX 5 EMERGENCY EXERCISES: CHEMICAL SPILL SCENARIO 
CHEMICAL SPILL - EVACUATION 
Scenario 
This scenario package includes assumed conditions, a narrative, eight major 
events, and detailed events with possible anticipated actions. 
Assumed Conditions 
The exercise simulates decisions made at a chemical plant security site with 
personnel from both the plant and emergency services, controller(s) of 
operations on site, and a co-ordinating group remote from the site (if 
established). 
The objectives of this: scenario include testing. assessing, evaluating, or 
practicing the following emergency activities: 
• Co-ordination between chemical plant security and local emergency 
services 
• Warning and/ or communications link between chemical plant and public 
• Establishment of emergency communications from site to emergency 
services' central controls 
• Major Emergency Plan activation 
• Evacuation transportation assignments and routing 
• Traffic controi assignments 
• Medical co-ordination 
• Decontamination 
• Care and shelter of evacuees 
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CHEMICAL SPILL - EVACUATION 
Narrative 
The Acme Chemicals Plant is located in an urban setting bordering an industrial 
area and adjacent to a residential' area. 
At 10.15 am a plant worker accidentally drives a forklift. with forks in the "up" 
position, into the side of a tanker truck containing chlorine. This causes a 
rupture of the vessel and a subsequent liquid chlorine spill. The forklift driver 
becomes a casualty due to contact with the liquid chlorine and prolonged 
exposure to the chlorine contaminated atmosphere. Several workers attempt to 
rescue the driver but are unable to do so because of the intensity of the chlorine 
spill and suffer from chlorine exposure. Other workers vacate the area and 
notify plant security of the incident. 
Upon arriving at the scene. the security officer recognises that a severely 
hazardous situation exists. sounds the plant alarm and begins evacuating the 
immediate plant areas surrounding the accident site. The fire brigade is notified 
of the incident. 
The fire brigade mobillses the pre-determined attendance for the plant to the 
incident. Upon verification of the incident and a determination of its severity 
other appropriate agencies are notified including the Garda Siochana. Civil 
Defence and the Ambulance Service. 
The Chief Fire Officer arrives on scene. realizes the situation far exceeds his 
service's capabilities. and activates the Major Emergency Plan. 
A Danger Area is set out by the CFO and Control and Holding Areas established. 
It is now 11.07 am. 
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MAJOR EVENTS 
1. Accident Reported 
.2. Emergency Services Response 
3. Activation of Major Emergency Plan 
4. Initial Command ActMties 
5. Schools 1n evacuation area request assistance 
6. Evacuation route congestion 
7. Medical effects 
8. Care and shelter of evacuees 
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DETAILED EVENTS 
Major Event: Accident reported 
Plant personnel advise plant 
sect1Ifty office that incident 
has occurred 
Securtty officer investigates 
incident 
Exercise Director 
Scenario requires that at this point 
warning of dangerous situation 
must be given 
Plant warning system activated 
Plant emergency team responds 
to incident 
Exercise Director 
Scenario requires that at this point 
incident is of such severity that 
plant personnel unable to control 
or contain incident 
Plant emergency team determines 
they are unable to contain incident 
70 
Should lead to investigation and 
assessment of reported incident 
Could lead to further actions such as 
activation of plant alarm. call for 
emergency services assistance, plant 
emergency procedures activation. 
full or partial plant evacuation 
Should lead to security officers' 
decision to evacuate immediate area 
and call for additional assistance 
(plant emergency team. emergency 
services. etc.) 
Decision required. Add further events 
as necessary to make certain 
warning system activated 
Should lead to activation of plant 
emergency procedures. i.e. 
notification of fire brigade. plant 
emergency team, evacuation of 
immediate area or other appropriate 
actions 
Should lead to assessment of incident 
and ability to plant personnel to 
contain incident. Could lead to 
initiation of plant personnel actions 
or call for emergency services 
assistance 
Decision required. Add events to 
ensure this criteria is met 
Should lead to call for emergency 
services assistance. Could lead to 
other emergency measures by plant 
emergency team such as evacuation 
assistance for immediate plant area. 
etc. 
Major Event: Emergency Services Response 
Plant security notifies fire brigade 
of incident and injuries incurred 
Fire alarm and communications 
dispatches assignment 
Ambulance service notified of 
reported injuries 
Officer of first attendance fire unit 
unable to determine incident 
location from security officer at 
plant entrance 
First attendance officer reports 
extensive product spill and 
subsequent vapor cloud 
Confusion prevalent in initial 
plant evacuation of immediate 
areas 
Fire brigade crews focus on 
evacuating employees from 
affected area 
Liquid spill and subsequent vapor 
cloud continues to increase in size 
Emergency personnel report. 
Numerous cases of exposure to 
chlorine 
Fire chief calls for activation 
of Major Emergency Plan 
Should prompt dispatchment of pre-
determined attendance according 
to standard operating procedure of 
fire brigade 
Should provide immediate emergency 
assistance, evaluation of hazard. etc. 
Could lead to call for additional 
assistance from outside agencies 
Should provide lmmediate response to 
incident site 
May result in establishment of a 
prelimtnary control point at the plant 
entrance and establishment of a 
communication and information 
system to direct/monitor operations 
to ellm1nate further confusion 
Could result in call for addltlonal 
evacuation. additional fire tenders. 
additional assistance from other 
agencies. etc. 
Could result in initial fire department 
in this operation 
Should result in more orderly and 
quicker evacuation of affected plant 
areas 
Could result in call for additional 
fire tenders or other agency 
assistance 
Should result in alert of area 
hospitals, increased Health Board 
response 
Should result in actions by local 
government agencies to begin 
emergency procedures as per Major 
Emergency Plan 
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Major Event 
Activation of Major Emergency Plan 
Danger Area and Control Area 
established on site 
Controller(s) of Operations 
establish(es) holding areas 
Major Emergency Plan becomes 
operational 
Senior personnel from main 
emergency response agencies 
briefed on incident 
Controller(s) of Operations 
request(s) additional personnel 
and logistics support 
Controller I CFO contacts plant 
engineers and requests advice 
Meteorological Office contacted 
Wind direction may cause chlorine 
cloud to be carried into populated 
areas 
It becomes apparent that chlorine 
cloud is moving toward populated 
area 
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Should result in response to Major 
Emergency Plan by appropriate 
representatives from various agencies 
as per Major Emergency Plan 
Should establish center for control 
of emergency operations effecting a 
coordinated approach to the 
handling of the incident 
Should result in central locations for 
all personnel. equipment. and 
appropriate services to assemble for 
dissemination of services 
Representatives from appropriate 
agencis now in attendance 
Should result in an understanding 
of situation currently encountered 
May result in response of additional 
emergency services units. response 
of (e.g.) Civil Defence and other 
appropriate agencies' support. Could 
require call for mutual aid assistance 
from neighbouring authorities and/ or 
call-in of off duty personnel 
Should result in establishment of 
Co-Ordinating Group at designated 
HQ 
Should provide technical advice 
pertaining to the product and for 
control of the incident 
Should result in determination 
of wind direction. dew point and 
precipitation probability. and 
other factors that may influence the 
emergency. 
Should prompt Controller I CFO to 
determine whether populated areas 
surrounding plant should be 
evacuated 
Should prompt evacuation order 
Exercise Director 
Scenario requires that order 
to evacuate be given at this 
time 
Evacuation begins 
Numerous pets and livestock found 
in area to be evacuated. Crews 
request instructions on whether 
they should be evacuated 
Decision required. Add events to 
ensure that order is given 
May be accomplished with door to 
door operations by emergency 
personnel, use of loud speakers on 
emergency vehicles and/ or use of 
braodcast media 
Should prompt consideration and 
decision on this issue 
Major Event- Schools in evacuation area request assistance 
Area schools seek advice on 
transportation and location of 
hospital shelters 
Traffic congestion at schools by 
anxious parents prevent buses 
from arriving 
School switchboards swamped by 
parents seeking location of children 
Congestion on evacuation route 
for buses 
Some buses low on fuel 
Indicates evacuation order being 
received. Should prompt action on 
dispatching buses to schools and 
advising drivers of destination and 
routes 
Indicates immediate need for traffic 
control at schools 
Should prompt public announcement 
of relocation area for schools 
May require additional traffic control 
or escort for buses 
Rapid allocation of available fuel 
necessary. Mobile tanker for on-
scene refuelling may be required 
Major Event- Evacuation route congestion 
Traffic moving too slowly for effective 
evacuation 
Wind direction is shifting and may 
lead to closing of primary 
evacuation route 
May indicate need for additional 
traffic control on evacuation route, 
use of alternate routes may be 
considered. Due to large number of 
persons in cars, radio broadcasts 
may be used for additional 
information dissemination. 
Indicates immediate decision may be 
necessary. 
Meteorological Office should be 
contacted for additional information. 
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Exercise Director 
Scenario requires that primary 
evacuation route be closed at 
this tlme 
Scenario requires that broadcast 
instructions change to order 
secondary evacuation route 
Traffic moving smoothly on 
secondary route 
Fire brigade advises that persons 
have been located in evacuation 
area with no transportation 
Traffic minimal on evacuation route 
Major Event- !\{edlcal Effects 
Hospital adjacent to evacuation 
area reports overflow of 
patients with respiratory 
distress from chlorine 
Primary shelter reports large 
numbers of persons arriving with 
respiratory distress 
Fuel for hospital emergency 
generator running low 
Evacuation of water treatment plant 
leads to lack of sanitary water 
supplies in some areas outside 
evacuation area 
Phone report that large numbers of 
animals have died at kennel in 
evacuation area 
Vehicle accident reported on 
evacuation route with multiple 
injuries 
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Exercise has determined that it wants 
primary route closed. If decision is 
not made, force it with spontaneous 
messages 
Exercise wants to test ability 
to change to secondary route 
Indicates message to change received 
and progressing effectively 
Should prompt dispatch of personnel 
to assist in evacuation. Could also 
prompt intensive search of area for 
others left behind 
Indicates that evacuation is almost 
complete. Could prompt release of 
traffic control personnel for other 
duties, such as looting prevention. 
May require Co-Ordinating Group to 
allocate ambulances, buses and other 
vehicles to transport patients to other 
facilities. Could lead to dispatch of 
medical personnel from other 
facilities to assist 
Immediate medical assistance 
needed, vehicles needed to transport 
victlms to medical facility and/ or 
dispatch medical team to shelter 
Allocation of available fuel needed. 
Should prompt check of other 
facilities using emergency generators 
to ascertain fuel levels 
Indicates need for distribution of 
potable water supplies and provision 
for sanitary sewer facilities. Possible 
use of portable toilets 
Might prompt dispatch of crew to 
dispose of dead animals in order to 
prevent sanitation problem. 
Possible dispatch of fire brigade and 
ambulance unit or preLiminary 
treatment by traffic officers on scene. 
Transportation for un.inJured 
passengers may be needed 
Risk area hospital asks for 
transportation to assist in 
release of non-critical patients 
Could:prompt use of mass transit 
vehicles. Controller or Co-ordinating 
Group may advise hospital to delay 
release until more opportune time. 
Major Event- Care and Shelter of Evacuees 
Large numbers of persons 
seeking relatives at relocation 
shelters 
Food supplies low at relocation 
shelter 
Evacuees at shelters seek facilities 
to phone relatives to advise that 
they are safe 
Primary shelter reports many evacuees 
have only the clothing they are 
wearing 
Number of evacuees has out 
stripped piimary shelters ability 
to provide food service 
Garda Siochana in host area . 
unable to provide personnel 
needed to maintain civil order 
and traffic control 
Indicates need for accurate lists of 
persons in shelters. May prompt 
formation of missing persons team 
Indicates need for allocation of 
available food to areas where 
needed, may lead to search for 
supplies and arrangements for 
cooking (e.g. Civil Defence. Army) 
Could lead to contact with Telecom 
Eireann to estasblish temporary 
phone service 
Possible need to provide some 
clothing, based on weather 
conditions and length of stay 
anticipated 
Could prompt dispatch of volunteer 
organiSation to assist. Use of 
commercial food establishment may 
be considered 
Could result in transfer of Gardai 
from risk area or provision of 
reinforcements from adjacent 
area 
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APPENDIX 6A INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN A NOTIFICATION 
(Based on the Fifth Schedule Part I to the Regulations) 
1. The name (including any registered business name) of the manufacturer together with the 
address of the establishment and the address of the registered place of busines. 
2. The following information relating to substances specified in Annexes II and III to the 
Directive which are set out in the Second and Third Schedules, respectively: 
(a) the data and information specified in Annex V to the Directive which is set out in Part 
IT to this Schedule and relates to the supply of data and information in connection with 
a notification provided for in Article 5 of the Directive, 
(b) a brief description of the hazards which may be created by the substances including 
immediate and delayed effects for man and for the environment, 
(c) the stage of the activity in which the substances are or maybe involved. 
(d) the chemical and physical behaviour of the substances under normal conditions of use 
in the industrial activity, and 
(e) any other substances whose presence could have an effect on the potential hazard 
presented by the industrial activity. 
3. The following information relating to the establishment: 
(a) a map of the establishment and its surrounding area to a scale large enough to show 
any features that may be significant in the assessment of the hazad or risk associated 
with the establishment, 
(b) a scale plan of the establishment showing the locations and quantities of all signficant 
inventories of the dangerous substance, 
(c) a description of the process or storage involving the dangerous substance and an 
indication of the conditions under which it is normally held, 
(d) the maximum number of persons likely to be present at the establishment, 
(e) information about the nature of the land use and the size and distribution of the 
population in the vicinity of the establishment, and 
(f) a general description of the technological processes used at the establishment. 
4. The following information relating to the management of the industrial 
activity: 
(a) the staffing arrangements for controlling the industrial activity with the name of the 
person responsible for safety at the establishment and the names of those who are 
authorised to implement emergency procedures and to inform the relevant competent 
authorities of such implementation, 
(b) the arrangements made to ensure that the means provided for the safe operation of the 
industrial activity are properly designed, constructed, tested, operated, inspected and 
maintained, and that the technical means necessary to deal with any malfunctions that 
arise are available at all times, and 
(c) the arrangements for training of persons working at the establishment. 
5. The following information relating to the possible major accidents: 
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(a) a description of the possible sources of a major accident and the conditions or events 
which could be significant in bringing one about, 
(b) a diagram of any plant in which the industrial activity is carried on, sufficient to show 
the features which are signficant as regards the potential for a major accident and its 
prevention or control, 
(c) a description of the measures taken to prevent, control or minimise the consequences 
of any major accident including methods available for rendering dangerous substances 
harmless in the event of accidental dispersion, 
(d) information about the emergency procedures laid down for dealing with a major 
accident occurring at the establishment including details of safety equipment, alarm 
systems and resources available, 
(e) information about prevailing meteorological conditions in the vicinity of the 
establishment and sources of danger arising from the location of the site, 
(f) an estimate of the number of people at the establishment who may be particularly 
exposed to the hazards considered in the report, 
(g) information relating to the nature, extent, and likely effects outside the establishment 
of possible major accidents, and 
(h) information relating to situations where substances may be transformed into dangerous 
substances in the case of abnormal conditions which can be foreseen. 
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APPENDIX 6B INFORMATION PACKAGE FOR THE 
SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC 
The contents of the information package as amended by S.I. 21 of 1992 (to account for the 
amended Directive 82/501/EEC- Annex VII) is as follows: 
- name of manufacturer and site address, 
- identify person giving information, 
-confirm that the site is subject to the "Seveso Regulations" and that the Competent 
Authority has been notified, 
- simple explanation of site activity, 
- common names and characteristics of relevant dangerous substances, 
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- general information on the nature of the accident hazard and its effects on man and the 
environment, 
- information on how the population will be warned and informed, what actions to be 
taken and the behaviour they should adopt, 
- confirm that the manufacturer makes on-site arrangements including their liaison with the 
emergency services to deal with accidents and minimise their effects, 
- reference off-site emergency plan, 
-location of further information subject to confidentiality. 
APPENDIX 7 A TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES 
Certification 
The contents to be included in the certificate is as follows: 
(i) A statement that the substance is in proper condition for transport and that all the 
relevant provisions of the Regulations have been complied with by the consignor; 
(ii) the name and address and telephone number of the consignor; 
(iii) the name of each substance being consigned; 
(iv) the weight of each substance; 
(v) details of the route to be followed; 
(vi) clear information on the nature of the dangers inherent in each substance being 
conveyed and the safety measures to be taken to deal with those dangers; 
(vii) the action to be taken and treatment to be given to persons coming into contact with 
or being exposed to the substance; 
(viii) the action to be taken in case of fire including the appropriate fire extinguishing 
agents to be used; 
(ix) the measures to be taken in the event of a spillage, and 
(x) instruction on the proper use of personal protective equipment and respiratory 
protective equipment provided. 
The information in paragraphs (vi) to (x) above is available in Tremcards published by 
CEFIC. If the appropriate Tremcard is attached to the Certificate, the Regulation is complied 
with. 
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EC PACKAGE LABELLING SYSTEM HAZARD WARNING LABELS CONT. 
(Supply and Conveyance) 
OXIDIZING CORROSIVE HARMFUU 
IRRITANT 
TOXIC/ 
VERY TOXIC 
EXPLOSIVE HIGHLY/ POLLUTANT 
EXTREMELY 
FLAMMABLE 
SAMPLE EC LABEL 
SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE 
CONTACT WITH ACIDS 
UBERATESTOXIC GAS 
CAUSESSURNS 
CORROSIVE 
Keep out out or ruc:h of 
ehildten . 
Alter c:ont•c:t w11h P in . 
wash imtntdiatffywith 
plentyofwaler. 
c~:,.~~v Emergency Telephone Only 
AOOAess Telephone Number 
Page 5 
----
1.- VEHICUS --..J 
~ffiu[ll]~[j] 
KEEP ORV THIS &10£ UP HA"'OlE WITH 
CARE 
NOTES 
~ 
MARtHE 
P'OLWTAHT 
Label• 5, S, 9: The symbol {cylinder. flame) may be black 
or white. 
Label22: May be red on white. 
Page 1: United Nations Labelt are internationally 
recognised and included in the Hazchem label and used 
in conjunction with AOR. RIO label. They are alao used for 
Air (ICAO, IATA) and Sea Transport (IMO). 
Page 213/4: Both the Hazchem label and lhe European 
AOR label are approved for road tankers. 
Pao- 5/8: This EC system is used for package& or 
containers i.e. small quantities. 
Page 6 (A41t Sl"f81NUe 7!1etz) 
EMERGENCY SERVICES HAZCARD 
HAZARD WARNING LABELS 
EllPt.OSIVE -----· ----1 
*~re~ "LAMMABLE $OLIOS 
$P()NTANiooav Y MHGe~~ox•OI8•,.~ COfiiiWST18lE wHEH WET . PEROXIO£ 'R' 
11 12 13 (~ 
~/ 
TOlUC 
15_4~~ HARMFUL 1Y't~ECTIOUS 
CORAOSIVI 
./ 
OfHEA OAHOEROU5 
SUBSTANCE 
Page1 
OfHEA OANOfAOUS 
sut$TANC£ 
at MULTI~O 
~ 
~ 
z 
~ 
~ 
~ 
....._J 
= 
~~ 
~ ~ ~ z 
~ 00 
= ~ ~ 0 
~~ 
~ 0 ;;· ~ 
~ ~ 
;=~ 
N CJ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~0 
~ 
00 
00 
~ 
= 00 
~ (1 
~ 
00 
CXl 
..... 
SAMPLE HAZCHEM LABEL 
NOTES FOB GUIDANCE 
FOG 
In the absence of fog equipment a line spray may be used 
DRY AGENT 
Water must not be alloweciiO come 11110 contact with the 
substance at rislt 
v 
can be 'Violently or 8\1811 explolliveiV I88Cillve. 
FULL 
Full body prolective dolhing with BA 
B.A. 
Braalhing apparaiiJa plu& protective gloves. 
DILUTE 
May be washed to drain w•lh large quantities of water. However 
due care must be IBken 10 avoid un~ pollulion of wa1er 
courses. 
CONTAIN 
p,_,, by any means available. spllage from enlering drains 
or water course. 
E 
Consider 8VIIQI8Iion. but dapencing on nallolnl of incident. it 
may be salarto keep people m doonl. 
Page 2 
Interpretation of The Emergency Action Code 
1 j WATER JETS j 
2 I WATER FOG l 
3 I FOAM l 
4 L DRY AGENT. l 
p v 
R FULL 
~ BA DILUTE v BA for FIRE only 
JJ BA BA for FIRE only 
i w v FULL X 
~ BA CONTAIN v BA for FIRE only 
~ BA BA for FIRE only ---
-
-~ ~·--
rEI -CONSIDER EVACUAOON-~-] 
Page3 
SAMPLE EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION LABEL 
ADR (ROAD) RID(RAIL) 
Either or both labels may be displayed on vehicles. The plain 
labellnd•cates a dangerous substance Ia baing transported. The 
coded label gives additional Information viz:· 
HAZARD IDENTIACAllOH NUMBER (LIDDer Pert· 2 or 3 ftgurts) 
The haZard ldentlfioetlon nurn1w oonalits of two or ttYee figures. 
In g-ral. the liauraa Indicate the follOwing haZards: 
2 Emission of gas due to pressure or to chemical 
reaction. 
3 Flammability of liquids (vapouna) and gases. 
4 Flammability of aoUda . 
5 Oxidizing (fire-intensifying) effect. 
6 Toxicity. 
7 RadiOactivity. 
6 Corroaivity. 
9 Risk of spontaneous violent reaction. 
OoubhnQ of a figure (e g 22. 331 ond•cates an imensiloeatoon of 
that part1cular hazard 
Where the hazard associated with a substance can be adeQuately 
•ndicated by a single figure. thos •s followed by a zero 
Some combinat•ons of figures have a spec•al meening, 
e.g:-
22-Refrigerated gas 
X333-Spontaneously •nllammable liQUid which reacts 
dangerously with water 
X423-lnflammable solid whoch reacts dangerously with water 
emitting inflammable gases. 
44-lnflammable solid in the molten state at an elevated 
temperature. 
539-lnflammable organ•c perox•de 
If a hazard idenlificatlon 111 prel•xed by the letter "X" this 
•ndicates that the substance w1ll react dangerously w•th 
water. 
SUBSTANCE IDENTifiCATION NUMBER (Lowlr Pert· 4 tlglrtl) 
Identifies the panlc:ular eubstancalnvolvad. 
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APPENDIX 8 LAYOUT FOR THE SITE OF A MAJOR EMERGENCY 
Recommended Layout for the Site of a Major Emergency 
Gardai secure 
perimeter and 
regulate access 
to site 1----+----, 
Egress from 
Site 
Access to 
site 
WIND 
DIRECTION 
1 
'IL----------"V-- - - - - - - -- - - - -- -- -- - .1.--~----~~ 
Ambulance Service 
and Emergency 
Medical Service 
Holding Area 
Local 
Authority 
Services 
Holding Area 
Other 
Agencies 
Holding Area 
Garda Press 
Casualty and Info. 
Info. Centre 
L:_lt __ ~ 
!Temporary Mortuary I HOLDING AREA !Canteen 
Ambulance Service 
and Emergency 
Medical Service 
(Includes Casualty 
collecting point) 
Control Area 
Local Authority Services Garda 
Control Area 
Control Area 
II\ 
In view of the danger no personnel should 
enter beyond the perimeter of the Danger Area 
unless agreed by the Local Authority Control of 
Distance to be decided by Local Authority 
Controller of Operations in consultation 
with other agencies. 
Operations. 
~----------~~D~A~N~G~E=R~~A=R=E~A--~~----------~ 
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Fire Service and Rescue Personnel wearing BA and 
Protective clothing where appropriate. 
All activities in this area are under the control of the 
Local Authority Controller of Operations. 
DOWNWIND DANGER AND 
EVACUATION AREA 
APPENDIX 9 BLANK DATA COLLECTION FORM 
DATA COLLECTION FORM 
1. ACCIDENT DATA 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
Activity Type: 
Transport c=J 
Nature of Activity: _________________________ _ 
Vehicle tachograph speed at time of accident: _______________ _ 
Brief Description of lncidenVAccident Type: 
Explosion: 
Fire: 
Release/Emissions: -~-------------------------
Spillage/leakage: ________________________ _ 
Dangerous Substances Involved: 
Name EECNrn UN Nos Hazard ID Masses Masses 
Nos. (UK) Involved Released 
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Applicable Regulations: 
Transport 
ADA Signs: D IMDG Signs: c=J HAZCHEM Signs c=J 
Other Signs: D 
Details of content of other signs: 
Details of any Labels: 
Relevant Tremcards: D Tremcard No: 
Substances: 
Emergency Procedures to be followed in the event of an accidenVincident: 
Other classification, packaging and labelling requirements: 
Was the Driver trained? D 
Fixed Installation 
Subject to general duties under Articles 3 & 4 of Directive 82/501/EEC: B Subject to specific duties under Articles 5, 7 & 8 of Directive 82/501 /EEC: 
Environmental Conditions at the site at the time of the incident: 
Weather: 
Proximity to population: 
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Description of the Incident/Accident: 
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Likely Potential Damage/Hazard(s) 
Man: 
Fatalities: D 
Injuries: D 
Environment: 
Air pollution: 
Water pollution: c=:J 
Land pollution: 
Other: 
Economic: 
Property: D 
D 
Agriculture (crops/livestock): D 
Production losses: D 
Traffic Congestion: D 
Other: 
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Actual Accident Damage 
Man: 
Fatalities: 
Off-Site 
On-Site 
Injuries: 
Off-Site 
On-Site 
Environment: 
Air pollution: 
Water pollution: 
Land pollution: 
Other: 
Economic: 
Property: 
Off-Site 
On-Site 
Agriculture (crops/livestock): 
Production losses: 
Traffic Congestion: 
Other: 
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2. EMERGENCY/PLANNING/PROPHYLACTIC PREPARATION: 
Fixed Installation: 
Emergency plans on-site: 
Was there an emergency plan? Yes D NoD 
Detail the general provisions for dealing with major accidents on-site: 
Detail the general criteria for calling the emergency services and their 
expected roles: 
Local Authority: 
Police: 
Medical Services: 
Other Services: 
Emergency plans off-site: 
Was there an emergency plan? Yes D NoD 
General provisions for dealing with accidents off-site: 
Provisions detailing the role of the emergency services: 
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Details of planned co-ordination with the on-site staff and/or other Local 
Competent Authorities: 
General provisions of any other emergency plans: 
Information available to the public (where relevant) 
Details of any safety information on possible accident hazards available to public: 
Methods of Communication: 
Transport 
Were there any emergency plans/certificates(fremcards? Yes D No D 
Provisions of emergency information included: 
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3. EMERGENCY ACTION 
Fixed Installation 
Emergency plan performance - on-site: 
When, how and by whom (title) were emergency plans activated? 
Emergency Services involved and Actions taken: 
Company internal emergency services: 
Local Authority: 
Police: 
Medical Services: 
Voluntary Services: 
Other Services/Information Centres: 
Emergency plan performance - off-site: 
When, how and by whom (title) was the off-site plan activated? 
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Emergency Services involved and Actions taken: 
Local Authority: 
Police: 
Medical Services: 
Voluntary Services: 
Other services/Information Centres: 
Information dissemination to the public during/after the accident/incident: 
Details of information: 
Method(s) of communication used: 
Management of press and media: 
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Transport: 
Emergency plan (if any) performance: 
Actions taken by the driver: 
Emergency Services involved and Actions taken: 
Local Authority: 
Police: 
Medical Services: 
Voluntary Services 
Other Services/Information Sources: 
92 
4. POST ACCIDENT ACTIONS TAKEN 
Details of e_ost accident actions taken: 
Emergency services involved and actions taken: 
Local Authority: 
Police: 
Medical Services: 
Voluntary Services: 
Other Services/Information Centres: 
93 
5. LESSONS LEARNT/EVALUATION OF EMERGENCY PLANNING 
Pre-planning: 
Comments on the suitability/efficiency of the emergency plans during/after the 
accident: 
Company Comments: 
HSA Comments: 
Emergency Services Comments: 
During/Post accident: 
Comments on the success/efficiency of emergency measures implemented: 
Company Comments: 
HSA Comments: 
Emergency Services Comments: 
Comments on the co-ordination between the emergency services, expert resources, 
voluntary services, other resources and the company involved. 
Company Comments: 
94 
HSA Comments: 
Comments on the efficiency of the role of the Emergency Services: 
Company Comments: 
Emergency Services Comments: 
Information provided to the Public and Media 
Comments on the suitabiity of the information provided: 
Company Comments: 
HSA Comments: 
Emergency Services Comments: 
Comments of the efficiency of the method(s) of dissemination: 
Company Comments: 
HSA Comments: 
Emergency Services Comments: 
95 
Additional Information: 
Comments on the suitability/efficiency of the emergency planning requirements as 
defined under S.l. 292 of 1986 which implements Directive 82/501/EEC: 
Company Comments: 
Comments on other post accident conclusions regarding Emergency Planning 
not already covered: 
Company Comments: 
6. INFORMATION SOURCES 
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European Commission 
EUR 15565- EC study- Lessons learnt from emergencies after accidents 
in Ireland involving dangerous substances 
D.R. Maxwell 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Community 
1994-98 pp.- 21.0 x 29.7 em 
Environment Quality of Life series 
ISBN 92-826-7516-5 
Price (excluding VAT) in Luxembourg: ECU 16,50 
The scope of the study encompasses emergency planning and response provisions for 
accidents in Ireland involving dangerous substances either in fixed installations subject 
to the requirements of the "Seveso Directives" or during transportation of dangerous 
chemical substances. The first part of the study is a comprehensive review of the Irish 
framework for emergency planning and response. The second part focuses on relevant 
accidents: four fixed installations and thirteen transport accidents have been selected 
to extract lessons on emergency preparedness and response. This reports continues 
the series of publication of similar studies performed for other EEC countries with the 
objective of improving dissemination of information for a common learning process. 
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